Lord Best: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that response, and for the good news that the Bill is now wending its way through another place. However, would he care to comment on why it took seven and a half months, after the lengthy pre-legislative scrutiny committee had done its work and after we had spent a good deal of time and effort in this House bringing the Bill almost to the point of conclusion before the general election in May 2005—and then spent further time deliberating it until November last year? Does he recognise that that delay in implementing measures that are highly valued by charities is more than inconvenient? The Bill contains measures to restructure the Charity Commission, to introduce an appeals tribunal and to facilitate mergers, and a good deal more that we badly need enacted.

Viscount Bridgeman: My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. To echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Best, can we have the Government's assurance that the Bill in its later stages will be given urgent consideration in the next Session?

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, I very much regret the delay. I apologise from the government Benches for any uncertainty that it may have caused, but I, like the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, also pay tribute to the charities for their patience and their constructive engagement with Government in bringing this legislation forward. The noble Lord played a major part in that, and I thank him for his work, as I do the noble Lord, Lord Best, because between them they made very valuable contributions to improving the quality of that legislation.

Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, does the Minister accept that the brutal oppression of women in Iraq reached its zenith under Saddam Hussein, although it is true that it has continued in some horrific ways? There are targeted assassinations and even reports of beheadings and other horrors, as well as the terrible victimisation of women for not wearing headscarves and so forth. While one understands that there is a limit to what outside governments, including HMG, can do and that these matters must be gripped in Baghdad by the government there, can we at least ensure that under the new constitution, which we advised on and supported, women really are protected and their rights really are enhanced so that we avoid the danger of institutionalising any kind of brutality or discrimination against women, as could be the case if we are not careful?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, I emphasise that there is absolutely no complacency about the position of women in Iraq, although if you look at the record of Saddam Hussein—the suppression of the Marsh Arabs, for example, wiped out vast numbers of people, both men and women—it is a problem that has been in that country for some time. We must take concrete steps. We have 170 police trainers in Iraq providing professional skills and training for the police, including training in the areas of greatest concern covered by the Question. The training modules include a programme of training specifically about women. We are involved in a training facility within the Ministry of Human Rights, training trainers and providing training curricula, particularly on the importance of women's issues. In the final analysis, of course we have to rely on the government and the people of Iraq to determine these outcomes in their society. However, we are doing what we can to help the process of construction at the beginning. In the end, they will decide whether it is successful.

Lord Warner: My Lords, there is, and has been for some time, a worrying rise in obesity among children. The obesity rates in two to 10 year-olds in England has risen over the past 10 to 12 years from less than 10 per cent to more than 14 per cent. We know that this is going on across most of the developed world and is leading to problems in type 2 diabetes, as my noble friend said. We need to carry on working hard to try to get this issue under better control.

Lord Rogan: My Lords, several years ago, I entered by mistake the wrong Committee Room and found myself sitting at the top table of the All-Party Group on Obesity. Having entered the room and been given some strange looks, I felt it would be rude to leave. At the end of the meeting, we were all given pedometers and told that if we walked 10,000 steps per day, we would not be obese. May I inform the Minister that I have religiously worn my pedometer since then and that, so far, it has worked?

Lord Warner: My Lords, the noble Lord is a tribute to his fateful encounter with the All-Party Group. He will be pleased to know that we are using pedometers in schools, and I hope that they will have the same beneficial effect there as they clearly have had on him.

Lord Warner: My Lords, I reassure noble friend that the Government remain committed to reviewing the success of measures undertaken on the balance of food and drink advertising and promotion to children in 2007. If these measures fail to produce change in the nature and balance of food promotion, we intend to take action through existing powers or new legislation to implement a clearly defined framework for regulating the promotion of food to children.

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, the Government will not negotiate or have discussions with Hamas Ministers until Hamas recognises the State of Israel, renounces violence and recognises the agreements that have already been made. Although the attacks being made by Israel are unutterably ghastly and we condemn them, we should not forget that Hamas wants to obliterate the State of Israel and has openly welcomed the attack by a suicide bomber. Both sides are to blame, and we have to bring both sides together.

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My Lords, I am sure that the Government both bilaterally and also through the EU and G8 are doing what they can to ensure that proper pressure is exerted on the Syrian Government to do exactly that.

The Earl of Sandwich: My Lords, is this not really a humanitarian and not a political question? The noble Baroness mentioned UNRWA and what we are doing in the way of relief and short-term measures, but what about employment? Surely it is the most urgent priority that we create jobs and the training to back them up?

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: In moving Amendment No. 93 I shall speak to Amendments Nos. 95 and 96. We now return to the issue that we broached briefly on Tuesday evening, a subject which the Government refer to as an extension of summary justice, whereas what is happening in practice is an extension of administrative punishment.
	The Secretary of State has the power to increase by secondary legislation the level of maximum penalty that may be imposed when a conditional caution is applied. At present the maximum of community punishment is 20 hours. The maximum fine is either one-quarter of the amount of the maximum that could be imposed in the court—that is, a quarter of £5,000 for the greatest offence involved—or a maximum of £500, whichever of the two sums is the lower. That is the position which the Government have provided for in the Bill as drafted. My Amendment No. 93 would remove the Secretary of State's power to change the 20 hours by order. Amendment No. 95 would remove the power to change the financial maximum by order, and Amendment No. 96 is consequential.
	The noble and learned Lord will be aware of the concerns that have been expressed about the potential expansion of the power to impose punishment without the involvement of a court. The Magistrates' Association has said this about the breadth of the powers currently proposed:
	"We are very alarmed that the Secretary of State should be given powers to increase these potential penalties in the future. It opens up the possibility of more serious offences, rather than the extremely low level ones, being dealt with outside a court".
	When this matter was debated in another place the Minister sought to assure the Committee there that conditional cautions would not be used in the context of more serious crime. The Minister said:
	"There is clear guidance from the Director of Public Prosecutions about the kind of offences that should be subject to conditional cautions. Because the conditions are set lower than the fines and punishments that magistrates courts can impose, it clearly is not appropriate to stray into that serious crime area".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee D, 23/03/06; col. 167.]
	But the Director of Public Prosecutions' guidance on conditional cautions does not provide the assurance against punitive conditional cautions being used to deal with more serious offences. On the contrary, it states:
	"there will be indictable only offences, [i.e. offences which are so serious they may only be tried in the Crown Court], in which a caution is appropriate because of the offence or the offender".
	That is quoted from the CPS website, section 3.
	I note that Norman Brennan, the director of the Victims of Crime Trust, has described the idea of extending punitive conditional cautions as "nonsense". He is quoted in the Daily Mail of 25 June as saying:
	"What sort of deterrent is this? The Government talks about the need for common sense, and that is certainly what the public wants, but this is the opposite".
	It is important that we should listen to views expressed in those terms.
	As the Minister in another place identified, the most realistic safeguard against the use of conditional cautions to deal with serious offences is a restriction upon the severity of the punitive condition that may be imposed. It is exactly for that reason that our amendment proposes that the Bill should prevent secondary legislation being used to allow more serious penalties being imposed and should contain an exhaustive list of conditions which may be included. I shall be interested to hear from the noble and learned Lord what the Government propose to do in response to the recommendation at paragraph 27 of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee's report.
	However, my concerns go far deeper than just whether or not the statutory instrument should be dealt with by the affirmative or negative resolution procedure. Here we are addressing the very real issue of the potential future expansion of administrative punishment at the decision of the Secretary of State, and especially being expanded by secondary legislation. We consider that this should be undertaken only when it is proved to be necessary, effective and fair. So far I am not persuaded that the drafting of Clause 15 fulfils that requirement, hence the series of groups of amendments that we have tabled—this being the first. I beg to move.

Lord Goldsmith: I believe that this is the first Committee over which the noble Baroness the Lord Speaker has presided. If it is, I very much hope that she will enjoy the day as much as I am sure the rest of us will. I welcome her to her post.
	Amendments Nos. 93 and 95 propose to remove the power of the Home Secretary to vary the maximum hours of attendance and the financial penalty that can be attached to a conditional caution. The reason for including those provisions is obvious; it is important to have a power to make amendment to those maxima if circumstances demonstrate that they need to be changed over time. If there is not a power to deal with them in this way, it will be necessary to find a slot in primary legislation to make what would probably be small adjustments. The time of this House and of the other place to initiate primary legislation is always precious. I am therefore not able to support the amendments to remove the power to vary those, but I hope that I can none the less offer reassurance on Amendment No. 96, which proposes to make the power to vary the maximum financial penalty by order subject to parliamentary scrutiny by affirmative resolution.
	The noble Baroness has rightly reminded the Committee that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has recommended that the affirmative procedure should be used for both the power to change the maximum financial penalty and the power to amend the maximum number of hours of attendance, except where the change is solely to take account of changes in the value of money. We have considered the recommendation and propose to table an amendment on Report to meet those concerns and to take account of what the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee said.
	The noble Baroness has also made broader observations on the conditional cautioning powers. As I said when opening this debate in the previous sitting, it may be more economical of time if I address those remarks when we come to the clause stand part debate which I think is to follow shortly. At this point I shall only say that I do not for a moment accept the proposition that conditional cautions are nonsense, if that is indeed a correct attribution to the gentleman quoted in the newspaper to whom the noble Baroness referred. It certainly is not nonsense to have conditional cautions; they are working at the moment. The noble Baroness and I agree in principle that we need to see that what is being done is, as she says, necessary, effective and fair. I do not have any disagreement with any of those adjectives. It may transpire that we will disagree on how they apply in particular circumstances, but we do not disagree on the objective. For the time being, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Lord Goldsmith: I was looking quizzically at the noble Baroness simply because I wanted to know what she was reading from. That is not intended in any sense as a dismissive remark. I was just not sure which document and section she had in mind. She said Section 22, but I am not sure that I can find it .

Lord Goldsmith: The noble Baroness was very generous in what she said at the start. I intended no hint of criticism at all; I was just trying to find the section.
	On the substance of the amendment, as I understood it, the noble Baroness made the point that the code of practice states that if the offender does not accept the conditions, then he will be prosecuted—not that there is anything in the code that for one moment suggests that you should not consider the offender's resources in determining whether it would be appropriate to impose a condition. Indeed, as there is currently not a power to impose a fine, that issue does not arise.
	Let me be very clear: there is absolutely no question of our wanting to create one law for the rich and one law for the poor. From this side of the House, if I may say so, we certainly would not want to do anything of the sort. Prosecutors will have to take into account a range of factors in determining what conditions it is appropriate to impose, and that will be applied to everyone. But the overriding requirement will be that the conditions are proportionate, achievable and appropriate to the offence and the offender. Plainly, if an unduly high financial penalty were proposed for an offender who was not in a position to meet it, that would mean that the condition was neither achievable nor appropriate. I would not want to see one aspect of those considerations singled out in the Bill when the overriding question should be whether the conditions overall are proportionate, achievable and appropriate to the offence and the offender. On that basis, I cannot accept the amendments.
	However, I take the opportunity to underline that this is not something that an offender is compelled to accept—a point that we have to keep in mind throughout this whole debate. The noble Baroness said—and it is important to underline it—that the offender has a choice of whether or not to accept the conditions that are proposed. If the offender does not choose to accept those conditions, the matter will go to court, where the magistrates—we are talking about low-level offences and so it will be magistrates—will determine what penalty to propose. Of course, when magistrates propose penalties, they take all the circumstances into account. I know very well that magistrates look to an offender's ability to pay in determining whether to impose a financial penalty and what it should be. So that will, in any event, condition the way that conditional cautions are offered as an alternative to prosecution.
	Lest there be any misunderstanding outside this Committee—I am sure that there is none within it—perhaps I may underline again that the current guidance to which the noble Baroness referred does not deal with financial penalties, because it has been written before such additions are possible. There is absolutely no question of that guidance saying, "Please, if you find a rich person, let them off with a fine, but if it is a poor person, send them to court". That is absolutely not the case and I want to stamp on that suggestion as hard as I possibly can.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: Because of some of the contributions made by the noble and learned Lord, I can be briefer than I might otherwise be, although there are some issues that I need to raise, having given notice that I do not believe that Clause 15 should stand part of the Bill.
	This is entirely a probing measure at this stage. My colleagues in another place made it clear that we did not oppose this clause going into the Bill. Our view was that we should see how the provisions in the clause were allowed to develop, consider whether it was effective and see whether the Government tried to expand its use too rapidly. Since these matters were discussed in another place, the Prime Minister announced that he intends to extend the use of administrative punishment substantially. That is a recent development. I should be grateful if the noble and learned Lord could put on the record exactly how that extension of administrative punishment will be achieved. Will what the Prime Minister announced require entirely new legislation? Will some or all of it be capable of being introduced via the primary and secondary legislation already in the Bill?
	I am going to quote the noble and learned Lord from the Daily Mail,so he will know directly whether it has got it hopelessly wrong or is correct—who knows which? The Government may be prepared to agree with press quotations for a change; we shall live and learn. On 25 June the Daily Mail quoted the noble and learned Lord as saying that he wanted to have much greater use of conditional cautions, echoing the Prime Minister's view of 23 June. The noble and learned Lord was quoted specifically as referring to punishments comprising,
	"a maximum penalty of £500 or 20 hours' community service".
	When I read that, I thought, "That is what the Bill says anyway". Is the noble and learned Lord telling us that the Government have marvellous plans for the future and that they will use what is here for their future expansion of justice? The quotation may be wrong, or I may be misjudging him.
	Will the noble and learned Lord make a clear statement about the consequences of accepting a conditional caution now under the Bill? Does it mean that a person will not have a criminal record for that offence? Will he give the Committee the figures on reoffending rates for those who have already accepted conditional cautions? It is essential to have such relevant information before we can properly consider whether the clause as drafted should stand part of the Bill.
	If we removed Clause 15, we would keep the current legal position whereby the only conditions that could be applied to cautions would be those intended to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender, or to ensure that the offender makes reparation for the offence. The debate goes to the heart of whether the Government would be right to press ahead with these plans for extending administrative punishment. I hope that the Government would never seek to portray those of us who are tabling amendments on this matter as trying to penalise victims and as being in favour of the suspected offender. Nothing is as simple as that in the world of offenders and offending.
	I realise, of course, that the person accepting the caution will have admitted their guilt as part of the process. As an ex-magistrate, I would certainly be concerned about the possibility that some people will accept a caution even when they are not guilty rather than go to court, and that the guilty will accept a caution, recognising that with their previous experience of crime they might well receive a lower punishment than if they went to court. Where is the public interest in that? Concern has been expressed both outside and inside Parliament that the power to impose punitive cautions will effectively allow the police and the CPS to act as investigator, prosecutor and judge.
	The Magistrates' Association, for example, states that it considers it,
	"contrary to the principles of justice for prosecutors and police to be able to impose punishment without the involvement of the judiciary. A democratic legal system ensures that an independent tribunal—the judiciary—should sentence and impose punishment, thus preventing bias from prosecutorial authorities".
	The Government's response has been to repeat their previous press release about,
	"rebalancing the system in favour of the victim".
	Of course, I say here and now that I have as much concern for victims of crime as any government Minister. Having sat as a magistrate for many years until I came to this House 10 years ago, however, I am also aware of the importance of careful reflection before punishment is imposed. Punishment is sentencing; we cannot get around that. Careful reflection should be based on thorough judicial training. I would much prefer that which cases should be sentenced in court was decided through statute, rather than giving prosecutors discretionary powers to impose punishment. A clear line should be drawn between an alternative to prosecution, which is what conditional cautions are intended to be in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and the imposition of a sentence, which we appear to be marching towards.
	Existing fixed penalties and penalty notices for disorder, and simple conditional cautions, are alternatives to prosecution. That seems right. An alternative to prosecution can properly involve reparation or measures to help rehabilitation, provided the matter being dealt with is genuinely minor. A disposal imposing punishment that involves an element of discretion becomes a form of sentence. That is where we must discuss whether it should be reserved for the courts, and not given as a power to the prosecution.
	Will the Minister confirm that offences for which a caution can be administered include: ABH; affray; criminal damage; possession of class A or B drugs, albeit a small quantity for personal use; having a bladed article in public; carrying an offensive weapon; burglary—non-commercial, non-residential—and theft? These are not necessarily just minor and low-level. If dealt with outside a court, there is no public knowledge of them. Where would the public accountability be? Judges and magistrates take an oath, receive training, operate in public and must announce the reasons for a sentence in open court, including any departure from sentencing guidelines. It is not the same for prosecutors. Where is their accountability?
	The Government have quoted Lord Justice Auld as supporting conditional cautions. In his 2001 review of the criminal courts, he said there was,
	"scope in England and Wales for the introduction of a more general, formalised and conditional cautioning system".
	However, he also said:
	"Any such scheme should, save for the most minor offences, be the responsibility of the Crown Prosecution Service and subject to the approval of the court. Without the protection of the court's approval, its use could be used or perceived as a 'cop-out' by the prosecution to avoid prosecuting cases that should be prosecuted, or of innocent",
	people,
	"being at risk of pressure to accept onerous compromises to avoid prosecution, or of the rich being able to buy their way out of prosecutions when the poor could not".
	The Select Committee on the Constitution also considers this provision a constitutional novelty. Of course, there is nothing wrong with novelty; it is quite right. One must refresh and renew all the time, provided one challenges those views with a bit of practicality. The Committee goes on to make a telling point:
	"It may be thought to sit uneasily with the principle of the rule of law, an element of which is that it is for independent courts—not the police or the prosecuting authorities—to punish criminal wrong-doing. This much has been enshrined in English constitutional law by the Bill of Rights 1689, which provides that 'fines and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction are illegal and void'".
	Of course, I agree with the Select Committee: the clause sits too uneasily with the rule of law. As yet, the Government have not quite justified the inclusion of Clause 15 in the Bill.

The Lord Bishop of Chester: When I read Clause 15 I was saddened, for the reasons that have been given in this debate. In a week when the Government have pushed through a clear separation between the legislative and judicial aspects of society, it is odd to see the confusions being introduced when punishment is taken out of the realm of the courts alone. If we go back to the origin of public courts, in Old Testament days and no doubt in other societies, they were to take the administration of justice out of the private and individual sphere and into the public sphere. It is essential that the administration of justice is a publicly recognised, accountable and observed process. Obviously, in any society there will be minor issues on the edge of the justice system that can be dealt with by fixed penalty notices or the caution system that has grown up and recently been extended. But to introduce the principle of punishment into the operation of the work of the police and the Crown Prosecution Service detracts from the principles of public justice that have been so much part of our society.
	It has been mentioned that the Government want to rebalance the system in favour of the victim. I do not see how this does so because victims need publicly observed and accountable justice. In parenthesis, I add that it is a great mistake for victims to be paraded before the courts to influence judges in the sentences they pass. It is against the principles of justice—this is a different matter, but it bears on what we are saying—if in the future, if victims are particularly upset, a greater penalty will be imposed. That is against the principle that justice is administered on behalf of society as a whole, which is why we have public courts. I think that is what lies behind the reservations of the Magistrates' Association.
	I also fear that it is not good for the police to do this. In our society, the police need to have a clearly defined and upheld role. In recent years, I have been saddened to see the police engaging in public political debate more than has been healthy for them. By all means, they can have private views and express them to the Government, but it has been a mistake to over-politicise the police. At the other end, it would be a great mistake if the police started to be seen as junior magistrates, which is the danger in these proposals. I hope that even at this very late stage the Government will see that the best response to the large prison population, the cost of the justice system and the rise in anti-social behaviour is not this sort of approach, but other approaches that will get to the root of what is happening.

Lord Goldsmith: I am grateful to all who have taken part in this debate. It is important to debate these issues. I recognise that the noble Baroness's Question is probing and therefore we will return to these issues, but it gives me an opportunity to set out one or two things.
	The conditional caution scheme in place was established under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. It provided the police and the Crown Prosecution Service with a new disposal for dealing with low-level offenders who were prepared to admit to their offences and who, if prosecuted, would probably have received a nominal fine, been ordered to pay compensation or given a conditional discharge at the magistrates' court.
	The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, is absolutely right that conditional cautioning is taking place in Thames Valley; it is one of the implementation areas. I can give him a bit more information about that outside the Chamber, if he would find it helpful. The noble Lord asked whether the CPS had always been involved. Absolutely, yes, because the scheme approved by this Chamber and by the other place was that conditional cautions would require the prosecution to decide the matter, obviously in co-operation, collaboration and discussion with the police.
	That it is the prosecutor's decision is very important, and, to some extent, it may meet the point raised by the right reverend Prelate. But it is the prosecutor and not the police deciding the conditional caution, although the latter have powers, to which I will return. The prosecutor must do that while recognising their professional responsibilities—they are sometimes described as a Minister of justice—and being directly accountable to the courts for what they do. I have seen that from time to time, when judges or Benches of magistrates have called in the local prosecutor and asked, often in open court "What has been going on here?" That is perfectly proper in appropriate cases.
	The very real benefits of conditional cautioning are: securing speedy redress for victims and enabling the offender—I emphasise, speedily—to tackle the factors that have contributed to his offending. I want to emphasise the benefit to the victim. Absolutely rightly, the right reverend Prelate asked what that meant for the victim. If I may say so, I am not convinced that he is right to say that victims always want to see things happen in court. Often, victims want something that deals with the situation speedily. I fear that at present, for all sorts of reasons—which we are trying to tackle, and we will come back to that issue—delays in court can be such that victims do not see a speedy response to the problem caused to them. On the contrary, it is dragged out: there may be adjournments; eventually the matter comes to court, at which stage the victim may be required to relive the experience and, at the end of it, to receive no more than could have been done under the conditional cautioning scheme a long time before.
	I recently referred publicly to a case in Lancashire where an elderly lady who had been the victim of some violence to her property was pleased that the property had been fixed by the young man and that he had apologised to her in a way that made her feel that the problem was solved. It also clearly drove home to him the consequences of his offending behaviour, because he had to confront, as it were, and address the problem that he had caused to an actual person. Again, the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, is absolutely right in saying that restorative justice can be very valuable in that way, although it is obviously not appropriate in all cases.
	The conditions attached to the caution can take specific account of the needs of the victim and therefore give the victim a voice without the need to go to court. The conditional caution code of practice, to which the noble Baroness referred in our previous debate, makes clear that victims' views should be taken into consideration by prosecutors when determining whether a conditional caution is a suitable disposal. That is important and I am sure that we will want to keep that as part of the future use of conditional cautions.
	What is a conditional caution? Here, I answer one of the questions put to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay. It is not a court sentence. It is not a criminal conviction. It is an admission of guilt, which can form part of an offender's criminal record and may influence how they are dealt with in future proceedings, in the same way as can a simple caution. It can be quoted on a standard or enhanced disclosure issued by the Criminal Records Bureau and made known to a prospective employer—the Committee may think that that is right.
	I return to the point about the relationship with the magistrates' courts. I hope that all Members of the Committee will recognise that the rule of law is something which I and the whole of the Government take very seriously and regard as very important. We must recognise what it means operationally. At the moment, there is considerable pressure on magistrates' courts. Cases can take a long time to get there, with many adjournments. The pressure on the magistrates' courts will not lessen; it may get greater because, under the Criminal Justice Act, they will have increased sentencing powers once that part of the Act is brought into effect. That will increase the volume of work that we will ask them to do—because we trust them and recognise the very important role that they play in society and in the community. We want to say "Let us remove from you straightforward, simple, low-level offences where there is a guilty plea. That will free up your time to deal with the more serious, complex and contested cases".
	Early implementation of the scheme in the past 14 months in a number of areas has highlighted the benefits of conditional cautions so far. However, the feedback that we have had from the police and the Crown Prosecution Service in the early implementation areas is that the benefits of the scheme are limited by the current restriction on the aims of the conditions that can be imposed, which must be reparative or rehabilitative. In particular, experience showed that the existing power in Section 22(3) did not give the flexibility needed to respond to offenders individually. Some offenders who should have got the benefits of the scheme were simply falling out of it for that reason. At the moment, conditions would need to be reparative, in which case the victim needs to be identifiable with a quantifiable loss and willing to accept reparation or rehabilitation, such as dealing—it is important that we should do this—with the underlying problems, such as drugs, alcohol and so forth.
	A particular problem was that it was thought that we could not use the existing conditions to provide indirect reparation. The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, has given one instance of indirect reparation through paying something back to the community. I shall be even more specific. If an offender produced some graffiti, it would be reparative to require him to take off that graffiti, but you could not require him to do so if you could not identify the graffiti for which he was responsible or if it had already been cleaned up by the local authority or the building's owner. Our interpretation of the Act is also that you could not require him to clean up other graffiti. Noble Lords might think that that is exactly the sort of situation in which you would want to consider being able to make a suitable offender see the consequences of his offending behaviour by doing something that is directly related to it.
	Clause 14 would therefore enable the scheme to apply to a broader group of offenders. It would include cases where direct reparation is not possible because of practical factors such as the victim's reluctance, the harm having already been remedied or the victim being the community at large. It would also include cases where the offender has acted out of character by committing the offence and has no discernible personal problems that contributed to the offending that demanded rehabilitation. Paying a financial penalty, undertaking unpaid work or attendance would be possible conditions. Yes, it is right to describe the measures as punitive, but they would also have a deterrent effect and an indirect reparative effect in the way that I have described.
	Noble Lords have referred to what Lord Justice Auld said about financial penalty in his report, and we should bear it in mind that fines by prosecutors have been a part of the system in another part of this Kingdom—Scotland—for a long time. I understand that they are not only accepted but welcomed in the community as a way of diverting low-level offending away from the court without the need for a court appearance. So welcome are they that there are proposals to increase the limit for those fiscal fines. Other countries use a similar system, and although, as I have said, I am very strongly in favour of the rule of law, I do not believe that in Scotland or in those other countries, allowing these conditions to be imposed in any sense undermines the rule of law.
	In that respect, I want to underline some very basic points. This does not apply except to an offender who admits his guilt. If someone contests his guilt, he goes to court. That will not change. If the prosecutor cannot decide whether he is guilty and cannot impose a caution, he goes to court. Secondly, he is under absolutely no obligation to accept the caution. Again, as I said, if he does not agree with the conditions and prefers to take his chances with the court, he is absolutely free to do so. Those are the key constitutional issues. The court will determine guilt where that is contested. Ultimately, the court is there to fix the penalty if the offender does not like the conditions proposed to him.
	On the previous day in Committee, the noble Baroness asked about the degree of consultation. I regret the fact that the earlier stages of developing our plans did not involve as much consultation with the groups that she identified as it should have done. But consultation has been taking place. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, the Lord Chancellor, and I have discussed these conditions with magistrates, judges and officials from the Office for Criminal Justice Reform. The office of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer and my office have held discussions with representatives of the Magistrates' Association and members of the senior judiciary. There has been at least one consultation with the Criminal Justice Council on which Victim Support is represented. At a local level, areas have engaged with victims groups and voluntary organisations. I am very happy, as is my noble and learned friend, to continue all such discussions. It is important that we debate these things.
	From time to time, reports appear in newspapers suggesting different things to those which the Government propose. The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, referred to a report in the Daily Mail, which rather remarkably quoted me as referring to the present proposals as if they were something else. She may not be entirely surprised to hear that I have not spoken to the newspaper. I think that it was quoting from a speech about this Bill rather than something else, but there we are. However, it is true—we will have to come back to this—that other things have been said about how we want to development the criminal justice system.
	The scheme overall is governed by the Conditional Cautioning: Code of Practice which has a statutory basis in the Act, which would be the same if the conditional cautions scheme is extended; that is, the same requirement for the Conditional Cautioning: Code of Practice will result. That is a matter therefore to which we will have to come back. On the question of to which offences it will apply, the overriding limit will be whether the conditions which are available are appropriate to the form of offending. If offences are of such a degree of seriousness that it is not appropriate for them to be dealt with by compensation, a short attendance, reparation or rehabilitation, they certainly will not be dealt with in it. The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, read from a list in the existing code of practice guidance issued by the DPP, which gives the constituency of offences that this could be used for. That obviously is not at all the same question as whether in a given case they should be used. There can be considerable levels of difference in the sort of offences and the offenders who commits them. She is right that one has to look at the offender.
	In conclusion, first, we already accept that in certain circumstances penalties are imposed outside the courts. The police do it in relation to fixed penalty notices in a number of areas. Members of the Committee might agree with me that to have an additional safeguard that the prosecutor imposes is beneficial and avoids just one mind looking at a case. Secondly, the experience so far has been that victims have found the conditional cautioning scheme helpful because they have been involved in it, they have had a voice and it has been much speedier. I know of one case where £1,000 compensation was paid within a week—or something of that sort—to a victim. I am afraid that that certainly would not happen under the court system as it presently operates. I hope that the Committee will see the benefits of conditional cautioning and will agree that Clause 15 should stand part.

The Lord Bishop of Chester: Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, I thank him for his earlier explanation. I accept that if the Crown Prosecution Service is seen as the driver of the system, it protects the police from being seen as junior magistrates, although maintaining that distinction will be very important. However, does the Minister share with me a sense that the term "administrative punishment", which is now being widely used, does not sound quite right? It gives the impression that it is the Government who are giving administrative punishment. I wonder whether any punishment that takes place other than through the courts should be seen somehow as on behalf of the courts. It is an essential principal that the courts in a democracy exercise the right to judgment and punishment. Perhaps the expression "administrative punishment", which rolls off the lips fairly easily, is rather unfortunate.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: Noble Lords will be pleased to learn that fairly shortly they will hear voices other than mine. In moving Amendment No. 97 I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 100 and 102 tabled in my name, and refer briefly to Amendment No. 98 to which I have added my name in support. My amendments are probing in nature. Clause 16 gives police constables a power of arrest without warrant where an offender is suspected of having breached the conditions of a conditional caution without reasonable excuse. The Government argue that this will speed up the prosecution of the original offence.
	The clause will insert a new Section 24A into Part 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and I ask that Amendments Nos. 97 and 102 should be read together. They would clarify that the various options specified in Section 24A(2)(a) to (c) would be available only where a prosecutor has decided that a condition of the caution has been breached without reasonable excuse. It would make it possible for the person to be released on bail before it has been determined whether that person has breached the conditions of their caution without reasonable excuse. New Section 24A(2) requires that a person who has been arrested for a suspected breach of the conditions of their caution should be "charged with the offence" for which they were originally arrested, or released on bail but without charge, or released without charge and without bail, but with the possibility of the conditional caution being varied. I do not have a problem with the proposal that the Section 24 powers should be used where it has been established that there has been a breach of the conditions of caution. However, Section 24 would not limit the use of the powers in that way; it would enable them to be exercised purely by virtue of the fact that the person has been arrested on suspicion of breaching a caution. Is that the Government's real intention?
	Where a person accepts a conditional caution instead of being prosecuted for an offence, they of course effectively enter into a contract with the state on the basis, "If I, the offender, comply with these conditions, you, the state, will not prosecute me". Surely it would not be right for the state then to breach that agreement by charging the person with the original offence unless it had first established that the person had indeed breached the conditions of the caution and thereby had broken their side of the agreement. Paragraph 176 of the Explanatory Notes acknowledges that this is not the intention:
	"If the person has failed to comply without a reasonable excuse, he can then be charged with the original offence in respect of which the conditional caution was given".
	The same argument could logically apply in relation to the proposal to vary the conditions of a caution to change unilaterally the terms of the deal between the state and the offender without any reason. My amendment simply clarifies the position. In addition, I recognise that of course it may be necessary to release someone on bail while it is being decided whether they have breached the conditional caution. Amendment No. 102 would enable that to happen.
	Amendment No. 100 would delete subsection (6) giving the police the power to keep the person in police detention while the investigation is under way about the suspected breach of the caution. The amendment has been tabled simply to probe how long the Government anticipate it would be reasonable for the police to keep a person in detention for this purpose. I realise, of course, that the noble and learned Lord is likely to give a full response to this point when replying to Amendment No. 99 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond. That amendment seeks to put a 12-hour limit on the length of time which a person arrested on suspicion of breaching a caution could be held in custody.
	I note that Hazel Blears stated on 23 March that the Government,
	"envisage a person as being held for a relatively short period".—(Official Report, Commons Standing Committee D, 23/3/06; col. 174.]
	So we have to ask the age-old question: how short is short? I would be grateful if the noble and learned Lord could address the specific point raised by the Magistrates' Association on this matter: what safeguards will be in place regarding the operation of that power by the police? Why would it be right for the police to have greater powers in relation to such cases than magistrates have in relation to breaches of court orders? I beg to move

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I shall speak to Amendments Nos. 98 and 99 which have been tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Dholakia. He is unable to be with us today, having gone to Scotland to be with my noble friend Lord Steel while he receives his honour. Clause 16(4) states that:
	"Where a person is released under subsection (2)(b), the custody officer must inform him that he is being released to enable a decision to be made as to whether he should be charged with the offence in question".
	Our amendment would insert at the end:
	"A person who is released following an arrest under this section shall not be re-arrested without warrant for the same suspected failure to comply with a condition attached to a conditional caution".
	I turn now to Amendment No. 99. As the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay of St Johns, has so rightly said, this amendment would put a 12-hour limit on the length of time for which a person arrested on the suspicion that he has breached a conditional caution could be held in custody. It would also prevent a person being re-arrested for the same suspected breach of a condition.
	As well as giving the police powers to arrest someone suspected of breaching a conditional caution, the Bill would allow them to detain the person indefinitely until they felt able to decide whether to charge or release. It must be remembered that the only purpose of this detention is to ascertain whether a condition has been breached and thereafter to decide whether to charge the person with the original offence or to release them, whether or not on bail. Given the restricted purpose for the detention and the Government's confidence that conditional cautions are to be used only for low-level offences, it would be entirely disproportionate to give the police an indefinite power of detention in such cases. The Magistrates' Association has gone as far as to describe this as,
	"a draconian power in relation to a matter that has not been before the judiciary".
	By contrast, strict time limits are rightly imposed on the powers of pre-charge detention where a person is suspected of having committed an offence. In such cases the suspect can be detained only for up to24 hours initially, with extensions taking total detention up to four days available by application to the courts. Within this time the police are required to gather sufficient evidence to decide whether to charge the person. That is a far harder task than deciding whether a condition has been breached. It would be indefensible to give the police the power to keep someone in custody for longer on suspicion of breach of a caution condition than on suspicion of a criminal offence. If the action which breached the caution was itself a crime, the person could be arrested for the crime and the police would not need to use the power under this clause.
	In Committee in another place, the right honourable Hazel Blears explained:
	"The provision is designed to enable a quick, on-the-spot inquiry to take place".
	Despite accepting that inquiries will usually be quick, she rejected the proposal to include a time limit on the face of the Bill, arguing that,
	"In the vast majority of cases, an hour or a couple of hours will be sufficient, but I cannot say categorically that it will be so; it will depend on the circumstances of the case".
	The amendment acknowledges that some flexibility is required and that it would be unworkable to impose a time limit of one or two hours. However, given the simple question the police are required to answer during the period of detention, these Benches consider that 12 hours should be more than enough to deal with a non-typical case. Without such a time limit, there is a real risk that these powers will be abused and there would be no incentive for the police to ensure that inquiries into the suspected breach are conducted as quickly as possible.
	In response to the call for a time limit to be imposed on the power of detention, again Hazel Blears explained that:
	"It would be a ridiculous state of affairs if the police had to release someone automatically and then rearrest them".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee D, 23/5/06; col. 174.]
	We agree. After the time limit for detention has expired, the police should not be able to re-arrest a person for the same suspected breach of a condition to enable the clock to start afresh. This would completely undermine the purpose of imposing a time limit and it is for this reason that our amendment would prevent re-arrest for the same alleged breach.

Lord Goldsmith: This series of amendments relates to Clause 16. I do not think there is any underlying disagreement about the need for Clause 16, which provides a quicker and more flexible response to suspected breaches of a conditional caution by providing powers of arrest and detention, with all the usual safeguards under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.
	First, let me make it clear that it is for the prosecutor, not the police, to decide whether an offender has breached the conditional caution and, if so, whether to charge the offender with the original offence. That is already in the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. That is essential background because Clause 16, as drafted, provides that various options are available once an offender has been brought into custody for a suspected breach. These are: either to charge with the offence in question—that is to say, the original offence; or, secondly, to be released by the police on bail, without charge, where further investigations are needed to determine non-compliance; or, thirdly, to be released without charge and not on bail where the prosecutor determines that there has been no breach of the conditions and, therefore, that the conditional caution should continue to run its course.
	Amendment No. 97, I believe, would have a negative impact for the offender—I recognise that that is not the reason the noble Baroness has brought it forward—because if the decision-making process is restricted to the prosecutor alone, the person could not be released, with or without bail, without the agreement of the prosecutor. That could mean that the person is detained longer than required while awaiting the availability of a prosecutor. So if someone is arrested at the weekend, in the evening or at a time when a prosecutor is not available, the police would not, for example, have the opportunity of exercising the power in subsection (2)(b) for the person to be,
	"released without charge and on bail to enable the decision to be made as to whether he should be charged with the offence".
	I am sure that is not what the noble Baroness had in mind. It would be contrary to what we have in mind in subsection (7) that the case must be dealt with,
	"as soon as practicable after the person arrested arrives at the police station".
	There would be an additional problem in involving the prosecutor because, under the PACE provisions, it is not for prosecutors to make decisions about bail; these are made by the custody sergeant. It would be difficult, disproportionate and have a number of implications now to put upon a prosecutor a responsibility for determining bail and conditions of bail, but only for conditional cautions and not for any other offences. So I cannot support Amendment No. 97.
	Let me give an example. It might be absolutely plain when the person arrives at the police station that the conditions have been complied with. He may have evidence with him—a letter, perhaps—proving it. Under the noble Baroness's amendment, the police still could not release that person until a prosecutor had been found to take that decision. I am sure that is not what she intends.
	Amendment No. 98 seeks to prevent the police re-arresting someone for the same suspected breach of a conditional caution without application to the court for a warrant of arrest, and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, explained the reasoning behind that. The background to this, again, is that Clause 16 is there to give the police a new power to arrest someone for a suspected breach to enable quick and effective enforcement of conditional cautions. If one required an application to the court for an arrest warrant, that would undermine that purpose by adding an additional stage and, therefore, delaying the enforcement process.
	As the noble Baroness eloquently explained, underlying this is a concern about the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to re-arrest. I can certainly imagine circumstances where it would be appropriate to re-arrest. For example, an offender may on the first occasion give a false explanation for the suspected breach which is accepted in good faith by the police officer, who then releases him. If it came to light subsequently that it was a false explanation, then it would be right, I would suggest, that the police should be able quickly to re-arrest him to get to the truth of the matter.
	Amendment No. 100 seeks wholesale removal of the police power to arrest and detain an offender for suspected breach. I have explained why we think it is important that there should be a power for the police to be able to respond quickly. But we certainly do not want offenders to be kept unduly in police detention while the case is being dealt with, so let me touch on the points about delay made by both noble Baronesses. Clause 16(7) makes it clear that there is a particular duty on the police to act expeditiously; and there is an additional requirement under subsection (6) that any detention to allow further investigation is strictly necessary, a point to which the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, drew attention. The power of detention is to enable a decision to be taken on whether there has been a breach and, if so, whether to charge the offender with the original offence.
	In practice, it may often be relatively straightforward to determine whether there has been a breach and, if there has been, whether the reason given by the offender for non-compliance is a reasonable excuse. But there may be occasions when it is necessary to detain for a short time in order to resolve the matter quickly. A telephone call might establish that the offender has committed the breach, in which case it would make no sense for the police to release the offender while seeking to confirm whether there has been a breach and, if there has been, then having to go to arrest him and bring him back to the police station to charge him with the original offence.
	What, therefore, about the time? AmendmentNo. 99 proposes a time limit of 12 hours. I certainly do not want to see a person who has committed a low level offence—which is what we are talking about in this Bill—and is suspected of a breaching a conditional caution being unduly or disproportionately detained by the police. There are two very important measures in the Bill which would prevent that. First, subsection (7), to which I have already drawn attention, will insert the new provision, specifically, that subsection (2) must be complied with as soon as practicable after the person arrested arrives at the police station. So there is an important and clear duty on the police to deal with the matter as soon as they practicably can.
	Secondly, Clause 16 makes it clear that the detention time restrictions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act apply to the powers of arrest for a suspected breach. Both noble Baronesses referred to existing time limits. Those time limits are not removed for this power of detention. There is therefore no need to insert an additional time limit; indeed, it is highly unlikely that the time limits under PACE would be reached. There is a worry, however, that if one imposes a time limit, even of 12 hours, there would be no room to manoeuvre to take account of specific circumstances.
	The offender might turn up in a drunken condition, which happens at quite a lot of police stations. It may be necessary for him to sober up before the questions can be put and the matter cleared up. It happens, too, from time to time that a fight breaks out in the custody suite which diverts police resources. There is a risk, therefore, that if one imposes an arbitrary time limit, it may not be possible to deal with those circumstances, although, I repeat it, everything has to be subject to the requirement in subsection (7) that the matter must be dealt with as soon as practicable after the person arrives.
	Amendment No. 102 seeks to make it clear that if after arrest for a suspected non-compliance with a conditional caution there is a need to conduct further investigation to determine whether there has been a breach, the offender may be released on bail rather than detained in custody while those investigations take place. It is absolutely our intention that that should be possible and the Bill already makes it sufficiently clear. One of the options in new Section 24A(2) is that someone can be released on bail without charge pending investigations to decide whether he should be charged for the original offence.
	Fundamentally, we hope that these investigations will not take long. We do not want to see conditional-caution offenders spending undue periods of time in police stations, but the power to arrest and detain is necessary for the reasons that I have given. I hope that, on consideration, the Committee will be satisfied that there are sufficient safeguards in the Bill to ensure that the potential for abuse to which the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, referred does not exist.

Lord Evans of Temple Guiting: I beg to move that the House do now resume. In moving this Motion, I suggest that Committee begin again not before 2.40 pm.

Baroness Neuberger: My Lords, before I begin I should declare several interests. I am a former member of the General Medical Council, of its fitness to practise committee at various stages, and of its education committee. I am also an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Physicians and the Royal College of General Practitioners, so I could be said to have an interest in some of this.
	Broadly, this order seems eminently sensible to us, and the Government are to be praised on having consulted so widely. Their report on their consultation is excellent. However, not all the questions have been answered, and I share some of the concerns expressed by the noble Earl, Lord Howe.
	We have all had representations from the MDU and the MPS, for which we are grateful. They raise some serious issues, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, has addressed them to some extent. New Section 44C gives the GMC powers to require doctors to have mandatory indemnity and also to determine what constitutes "adequate and appropriate indemnity"—that is absolutely right. It must be right that doctors should have compulsory insurance or mandatory indemnity. But the Medical Defence Union argues that this order may allow discretionary indemnity to be used to indemnify doctors and that such doctors would then have no right to receive assistance with a claim but only the right to request assistance. Given the scale of some payments in the current climate, might not discretionary indemnity be simply inadequate to meet doctors' and patients' needs—assuming that the MDU is right? I do not know the answers to any of these matters; I am genuinely asking the Minister for clarification.
	The Medical Defence Union has argued that discretionary indemnity is not regulated, and nor are the providers of wholly discretionary indemnity, in the manner in which insurers and providers of insurance are regulated by the FSA. It also argues that there is no contract, that no companies providing discretionary indemnity may give a doctor a guarantee that they will assist with clinical negligence claims, and that to do so would be to carry on an unregulated insurance business, which is a criminal offence.
	The MDU gives a variety of other reasons why it is concerned; but one can see why that may be the case, because both kinds of indemnity and insurance have existed in parallel over many years. It seems significant that three UK healthcare regulators—the general optical, osteopathic and chiropractic councils—already require healthcare professionals registered with them to have an insurance policy because they received legal advice that discretionary indemnity does not meet the definition of "properly insured".
	Will the Minister clarify whether the Government are concerned about that and whether they think the MDU's representations are right or wrong? They may be right, but I simply do not have the expertise to tell. It would also be good to hear whether the Government will insist that an indemnifier give an explicit and enforceable undertaking to pay for negligence claims that arise from normal clinical practice. The MPS says that it has never withheld such payment, but what would happen if others joined the market? Indeed, one might argue, as the MDU does, that the indemnifier and the terms and conditions of indemnity should meet minimum terms and conditions. That seems nearer the Medical Protection Society's position, but it would be good if the Minister could clarify that.
	The question of indemnity cover for retired doctors was raised in another place. Again, it would be very good to hear what the Minister has to say about this and how satisfactory the situation will be.
	The second point is the change from limited registration, which the noble Earl, Lord Howe, raised. Those who would formerly have had limited registration, such as those who graduated overseas, will now have full registration. How will that work in practice? Who will undertake the approval in approved working environments—another point raised by the noble Earl, Lord Howe—and how will the approved working environments be monitored in the longer term? What will the standard be and, as the Member for Westbury asked in another place, what will be the impact on existing trainees who are supervised? It would be very good to hear how the Minister perceives that monitoring will be approached.
	Generally, however, we are very pleased that this measure gets rid of some of the unfairness to doctors who have not trained in the UK and who wish to continue training here. But how does that fit with new decisions to change the immigration status of doctors from overseas, who have in the past served us so well in the National Health Service? We have discussed this before, including recently in Questions, and we will no doubt do so again, but it would be good to hear what the Minister has to say about what might be argued to be two apparently mutually contradictory policy directions.
	The Member for Romsey in another place raised the issue of mutual recognition for EU graduates set out in EU law. That does not include the English language proficiency tests, yet Section 21B(1)(d) states that a person can be registered if he satisfies the registrar,
	"unless he is an exempt person, that he has the necessary knowledge of English".
	Sandra Gidley asked the Minister in another place to clarify whether the phrase "exempt person" meant doctors from the EU. The Minister answered, rightly, that EU law requires us to register them as doctors, but he added that there is nothing to stop employers imposing a language requirement on a person seeking to work in a specific place. It would be good to hear from the Minister how realistic and important he thinks that is, as this has been an issue in the National Health Service.
	Those issues aside, we are broadly content with the order and are particularly impressed with the consultation that the Government undertook.

Viscount Bridgeman: I speak to the amendments in this group in the name of my noble friend Lady Anelay and myself. They cover a range of issues about the clause and the community call to action. As such, I hope that the Committee will have patience if I run through them.
	Amendment No. 104, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, was tabled as an alternative way of raising the issues I had highlighted in the probing amendment, Amendment No. 106. That amendment would insert a new subsection to ensure that when a councillor is considering a matter brought to him as a community call for action, he must, where reasonably practical, make inquiries as to the person or child's mental health and learning difficulties.
	It is by no means a perfect amendment, and I question whether a councillor should have access to such information, but we were raising the issue of inappropriately applied ASBOs. Will the Minister confirm whether the Home Office guidance on appropriate procedures to be followed includes any consideration of the rights and needs of disabled people? I am sure that he is aware of research compiled by Napo, showing strong evidence of children and young people with neurological disorders being inappropriately issued with ASBOs. I cite the following examples.
	First, a 15 year-old boy with Asperger's syndrome and no criminal convictions was given an ASBO with the condition that he was not to look over and stare into his neighbour's garden. The neighbours had reported the boy to the police for persistently looking into their garden. The court was aware of his circumstances, but still issued the ASBO. Secondly, a 15 year-old boy with Tourette's syndrome was given an ASBO with the condition that he did not swear in public. Thirdly, a boy who had been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and his mother were evicted from their home and served with an ASBO because of the son's "bad behaviour".
	This is serious concern, not only in terms of finding the correct support for the underlying reasons for certain behaviour, but also because it shows a lack of understanding of specific medical problems in the general community, which perhaps also needs to be addressed. It adds to the concern expressed by children's societies, in particular, that the call to action could, without sufficient safeguards, militate against the safety and welfare of children. As an aside, will local authorities be asked to include the voice of the child in designing these services, as the Childcare Bill has recently been amended to require?
	Amendment No. 105 removes the exclusion of county councils from the definition of local authority in Clause 17 in order to probe the reason for their exclusion. Amendment No. 108 plays a dual role. The first is to question the drafting of the Bill. Would it not make sense to continue to refer to the member of the local authority as "the councillor" as in subsection (3)? Secondly, it asks for clarification about how the clause would work if the local government used a Cabinet-based system. The County Councils' Network has expressed serious concerns regarding the exclusion of county councils from the definition of local authority in Clause 17 and thus from the community call for action. The community call for action aims to promote and improve local accountability, and the CCN argues that this exclusion compromises a county councillor's democratic accountability to his local community and his existing relationships with local people. By limiting the function to district council members, but labelling those members as "ward members", the Bill fails to recognise that county councillors also play a local representative role. The Minister will be well aware of that nuance.
	One could suggest that the omission of county councillors may conflict with proposals for a strategic-level role for counties in terms of CDRPs, LAAs and LSPs. The Crime and Disorder Act review proposed a strategic level CDRP to function at county council level. That has not been translated into the Bill. Surely, enabling county members to respond to a call for action would support the scrutiny arrangements and provide a read-across to larger police authorities and probation services. I hope the Minister can explain to the Committee why this decision has been taken following the CDA review and what consideration the Government have given to the County Council Network's concerns, as well as answering the two questions that we posed when speaking to Amendment No. 108.
	I now turn to Amendments Nos. 107 and 110 and to the consequential amendment, AmendmentNo. 112. Amendments Nos. 107 and 110 insert new subsections referring to Clause 17(3) and (5) to place a duty on the local authority member acting on a call for action to inform the person or, in the case of a child, his parents, against whom the complaint has been made and clearly to set out the procedures by which to respond to the allegations. Not only could this flag up mental or learning disabilities, which we discussed earlier, but it also supports a person's rights to a fair hearing at local level. We must remember that there is a presumption that a person is innocent until he is proven guilty, although that is slowly being undermined by the Bill.
	I do not claim that the drafting of these amendments is perfect, or even that this is the best way to address this issue. These are probing amendments. However, there are concerns that this clause could lead to complaints about young people being brought forward that involve allegations of misbehaviour based on a single incident or a rumour or that may be malicious. I hope the Minister can address the concerns that we have raised.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate for the thoughtful way in which they have approached the issues that have been raised. That is extraordinarily helpful because we are trying to put forward a proposition in engineering the community call for action. The community call for action is designed to deal with difficult situations where members of local communities feel that they have been overlooked, that their local concerns and issues with matters such as low-level disorder are not high up the list of priorities of the local police service, and that the local authority and there is a genuine call from local community members to try to change that situation.
	I shall work through the amendments as best I can and then conclude by summarising where we are. My noble friend Lady Henig explained the amendments tabled in her name, which require that community safety partners involved in a community call for action are consulted at each stage of the process. I find that hard to disagree with. I can reassure her that consultation with the relevant partners is at the core of how we see the community call for action operating. Ward councillors, local authority executives and overview and scrutiny committees will be required to engage with the relevant authorities at each stage of the process. We will provide for that in the guidance on the detail of the operation of the community call for action. I hope that reassurance will satisfy her.
	As the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, said, there is always difficulty about how prescriptive one should be in legislation. We are trying not to make the legislation overly rigid and to provide flexibility. We can best do that by detailing in guidance the way in which we see the community call for action working through consultation.
	Amendment No. 113 would amend the community call for action so that community safety partners would merely be required to respond to the reports and recommendations of overview and scrutiny committees and would not be required to have regard to their reports and recommendations in exercising their functions. It is not the case that having regard to recommendations will require community safety partners to give effect to them, it merely means that they must consider them when exercising their functions.
	I am sure that noble Lords would agree that where the local community has raised concerns which have been investigated by the ward councillor and the scrutiny committee in collaboration with the community safety partners, it is only right that the partners should at least have regard to the report and recommendations of the committee. If there are well-founded reasons for not acting on a recommendation—for example, because it would divert resources from another neighbourhood—the relevant responsible authority would be able to set aside the recommendation, but it would need to explain its reasons in front of the overview and scrutiny committee. I trust that the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, agrees that in those circumstances it would be appropriate to retain the duty to have regard to scrutiny committee recommendations.
	The remaining amendments, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, relate to the operation of the community call for action in relation to individuals. Before I get into the detail of the amendments, it may assist the Committee if I explain how we envisage the community call for action working in practice. Let me make one thing clear: we regard the community call for action as a backstop, a final measure. If neighbourhood policing is working as it should and if crime and disorder reduction partnerships are operating as they should, they will be responsive to the needs of local communities. They will be addressing, in their day-to-day activities, the street crime, burglaries, drug dealing, alcohol-fuelled disorder or criminal damage that are the prevalent community safety concerns of particular neighbourhoods.
	Where appropriate, the police will be targeting known local prolific offenders, and the local authority will be targeting problem families with the tools at their disposal, including parenting orders and contracts and anti-social behaviour orders. If there is a genuinely responsive and intelligence-led approach to tackling crime and anti-social behaviour, local communities, I am sure, will have confidence that the issues of concern to them are being properly dealt with. There will, therefore, be no need to resort to the community call for action.
	However, the community call for action will be available where there is a persistent local problem that the police, local authorities and perhaps some of the other members of the partnership have failed to address. Such a problem might take the form of, for example, drunken behaviour late at night in a residential area, repeated criminal damage on a housing estate, perhaps drug-related activity or continuing anti-social behaviour by a group of young people.
	In many cases the criminal or anti-social behaviour complained about may be committed by a person or persons unknown to the complainants. That will not exclusively be the case. If the disruption is, for example, caused by a particular problem family, the names of the alleged perpetrators may be known to local residents. But I expect that to be the exception rather than commonly the case.
	We should consider Amendments Nos. 106, 107, 110 and 112 against that backdrop. These rather assume that the name of the alleged offenders will be known in all cases. Perhaps that is not the case, but that seems to be the assumption behind those amendments. As I have sought to explain, that is not necessarily the case. So, a general requirement on the councillor, the local authority or the overview and scrutiny committee to notify the person or persons who are the subject of the community call for action would not be appropriate. Moreover, I am not persuaded that it is properly the responsibility of the local councillor to engage directly with a named individual or individuals who are the subject of a complaint. The councillor will have, and, I would say, should have, a responsibility to refer the issue raised by local residents to the police and perhaps also to the local authority to see whether the matter can be resolved informally—that is, without reference to the overview and scrutiny committee.
	I think that it would perhaps endanger the more general role of councillors if they were placed under an obligation to become directly and personally involved with an individual. In this instance that is not really an appropriate role for them.
	If, on consideration of the issue, the police or local authority considers that action should be taken against a known individual or well known family, it will be their responsibility in the normal way, not the councillor's, to make contact with the person or persons concerned. If the council considers that a parenting contract is appropriate, it will clearly need to enter into a dialogue with the parents concerned. If an ASBO is the right course, the person against whom it is intended to secure it will have an opportunity to put his case before the court considering the application. The same broad approach will apply if other specific action is taken against named individuals. Their rights are adequately protected by other legislation governing ASBOs, parenting contracts and orders, or whatever other tool is used to tackle offending or anti-social behaviour.
	We do not need to build additional safeguards into Clause 17. To the extent that it is necessary to touch on such issues in the context of the community call for action, we can do so in the guidance issued under Clause 18. I am mindful of the comments that the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, made about ASBOs and the NAPO report on those who have had mental health problems and have been caught up in the ASBO process. I acknowledge that that is an issue. I, too, have read newspaper reports of the same calibre and nature as those mentioned by the noble Viscount. I understand the issue. That is why we think it is probably more appropriate to deal with such issues in guidance rather than in the detail of the legislation.
	Perhaps it is worth adding that one possible course of action is for the police to investigate the offence and arrest and charge the alleged offender. That may actually be the most appropriate way to tackle the issues. In such circumstances, informing the alleged offender, as the amendments propose, might actually inhibit any investigation.
	Amendment No. 105 deals with a separate point. It seeks to extend the community call for action to cover county councils as well as district councils in two-tier areas. I am sensitive to the noble Viscount's point. I have operated in a two-tier system and I have operated in a unitary system. I concluded from my experience—the noble Viscount will not be surprised to hear me say this—that a single-tier system in local government is probably the best. However, I recognise the invaluable role that each part plays within a two-tier system. We are keen to avoid confusion and overlap, which was one of my issues with the two-tier structure.
	A formal role for county councillors, and certainly for county overview and scrutiny committees in the community call for action, could create considerable overlap. A situation could arise where a member of the public raises an issue at both district and county level and resources are needlessly dedicated to deal with it at both levels. That would not be a wise use of time or resource.
	Opening the community call for action to county level has all the potential for confusion and could create significant additional burdens on county scrutiny committee processes. I hope that noble Lords will agree that such confusion and overlap is best avoided. If the community call for action issue is indicative of a more strategic problem that is not restricted to the district crime and disorder reduction partnership, the guidance that will accompany this provision will be clear that that will need to be fed into the county scrutiny committee, which would then pick it up as part of its regular assessment of CDRP activity across the county. That is provided for in the Bill.
	The community call for action is concerned with local crime and disorder issues and therefore it is entirely appropriate for the local district councillor and district overview and scrutiny committees to deal with such issues.
	Finally, I turn to Amendment No. 108, which seeks to simplify the drafting of Clause 17(4). We have used the term,
	"a member of a local authority",
	rather than referring to a "councillor" because the phraseology needs to capture the City of London as well as other councils. The parliamentary draftsman did not consider the word "councillor" to be apt to describe all the members of the Common Council of the City of London, including the Lord Mayor of London and aldermen. So it was drafted in that way for that reason.
	I hope that my explanations will satisfy my noble friend Lady Henig, the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, and the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, acting in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, and that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Henig: As ever, my noble friend has gone some way to reassure me. I have listened very carefully to everything that has been said. I fully agree that guidance is just that—guidance. We should not be too prescriptive. I share that view. The problem is, as we all know, that local councils and CDRPs differ in quality. My guess is that the good ones will, indeed, follow the guidance; my worry is that the fair or possibly weak councils will be those where guidance may not be followed. That is precisely where the problems will arise, and why I wanted to have a little more prescription to avoid what will otherwise be difficulties in certain areas.
	I would like a bit of consistency here. In debates on earlier parts of the Bill when I was arguing for flexibility, my noble friend assured me that the Government needed reserved powers. While most police authorities would of course be responsible, he said, the Government needed reserved powers because there would be one or two that might be difficult. If that is the case for police authorities, is it not also the case for weak councils? We should be flexible throughout the Bill, and that includes a whole number of areas that we have already had discussions on, which includes issues with reserved powers and police authorities. If my noble friend is offering to be flexible there, I would feel more able to be flexible here. On the other hand, if we are going to be prescriptive because police authorities will cause problems, I submit that that is the case with councils and therefore we need to be consistent and be prescriptive for them as well.
	In that spirit I draw some comfort from what my noble friend said but I feel that there are issues which we may well have to return to at a later stage, both here and also—I did not have time to say this earlier when we were discussing them—on CDRPs. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: The amendment ensures a positive obligation to collect data on offences motivated by prejudice. I am grateful to the Guide Dogs for the Blind Association for providing briefing material. Most work on hate crime does not include hate crime committed against disabled people. The lack of statistics hampers work on this issue.
	In tackling hate crime of this nature, it would therefore be helpful if police forces were obliged to record details about a person's disability, along with their access needs. We are pleased that the Metropolitan Police have already identified this as an issue and are currently reviewing their procedures to ensure that the statistics that they already collect on hate crime are as accurate as possible. Our organisations raised this matter during the passage of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Government said that they would conduct a review of the collection of police statistics. Our organisations would welcome an update on the outcome of that review, if the Minister can provide it.
	In the United States, legislation requiring data collection has proved to be a powerful mechanism to confront violent bigotry against individuals on the basis of their race, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity, and has increased public awareness of the problem. As a result, there has been an increase in the reporting of those offences. The Department of Justice has established a new toll-free phone number to report complaints of hate crimes. Studies have demonstrated that the victims are more likely to report a hate crime if they know that a special reporting system is in place.
	Although the disability equality duty will clearly require the gathering of information about this ability, there is no such requirement about sexual orientation. For the avoidance of doubt in relation to disability, to prepare for any future duty concerning sexual orientation and for the better delivery of criminal justice, that should be made clear in the Bill. By placing a specific requirement in the Bill, the Government would make it clear that the collection of hate crime statistics was compulsory. Such a requirement would also complement Section 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which was brought into force in April 2005, and provides for additional penalties for disability and homophobic hate crimes. Such a requirement would also be consistent with the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order, which requires the collection of statistics in Northern Ireland.
	We also believe that more accurate statistics will to help the police to devise effective strategies for dealing with all forms of hate crime. I beg to move.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I support the amendment, to which I have added my name. I am also grateful to the Guide Dogs for the Blind Association for its briefing on this matter. The noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, refers to debates that we had in 2003 discussing the Criminal Justice Act. I tabled a similar amendment then, but I agree that it was not as effective as this one, because mine addressed only the issue of disability. It did not consider the broader groups categorised in the noble Baroness's amendment and I prefer hers. It is right that we should take that broader application forward.
	The difficulty is that none of us wants to impose greater bureaucracy on those who are trying to prevent, police and prosecute crime. It is proper to ensure that there is a collection of statistics on reported crime so that there is not only greater public awareness of what constitutes a crime but that people have greater confidence that if they report crimes, they will be taken seriously. The amendment is intended to ensure that those who are the victims of hate crimes have the confidence to support it—which currently they may not. It is possible that it is under-reported. We are not trying to encourage people who are the victims of what they think may be a crime that does not fall within this category to go ahead and report it. It is an attempt to balance bureaucracy with the effective reporting of crime.
	I note that before Mr Charles Clarke went the way of a few Cabinet Ministers recently, he said that he accepted that the way in which the Home Office collects statistics may not be sufficiently robust—he was talking about the broad range of crime statistics—and that there was a lack of public and police confidence in them. He said that there would be a Home Office review of the collection of statistics. When he comes to respond, can the Minister say whether the Government are still minded to carry forward that review and, if so, whether the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, in her amendment will form part of that broader review?

Baroness Darcy de Knayth: Very briefly, having also been enthused by the briefing to the Guide Dogs for the Blind Association, I give a warm welcome from the sidelines—because I have not taken any part in discussion on the Bill. We have heard the evidence from the United States about how data collection increases public awareness and reporting of offences. A free phone line, if it were possible, would be a very good idea, too. We know from the helpline for the London bombings how very helpful that has been. I hope the Minister will respond very positively to the amendment.

Baroness Linklater of Butterstone: Amendment No. 116 would reinstate the 70-year-old protection of reporting restrictions in the cases of children who are subject to ASBO proceedings or ASBO breach proceedings. There would once again be a presumption of reporting restrictions and therefore the protection of anonymity for the child. Article 40(2)(vii) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child clearly asserts that children have the right to privacy,
	"at all stages of proceedings".
	Article 3 requires that,
	"the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration",
	in all decision-making. Article 19 requires states to ensure that the child is protected from all forms of violence.
	Until the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, then reinforced by the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, reporting restrictions were in place under the Children and Young Persons Act 1932, consolidated by the 1933 Act. In other words, it was understood that children were in need of protection, even children in trouble. Have the Government really altered their view that children do not need this protection? The position was changed in 2003 when the deeply unattractive and damaging process of naming and shaming was introduced. It is a sort of modern-day version of putting someone in the stocks, and children at that. We argued against the process then but are even more convinced now as we have seen how uncivilised, uncivilising and seriously counterproductive the process has proven to be.
	The Government argue that the orders are a way that communities can be told how children subject to ASBOs are being dealt with and that they encourage local monitoring of these children by identifying them. But there are plenty of ways of telling communities of strategies, programmes and services that are available to local children and families without targeting and publicising individuals. Indeed, local authorities are required by statute to prepare crime and disorder strategies and children and young people plans and to involve local people in their development.
	I declare an interest as chair of Rethinking Crime and Punishment, where we are running an extremely positive programme of engaging local communities in the development and delivery of community penalties in the Thames Valley. We have seen how constructive such an approach is. However, the public targeting, publicising and inevitable demonising of young people is a quite different matter. In most cases it creates misery for the child and the family, often accompanied by bullying and ostracism. I think that we are all familiar with the sorts of press coverage given to children in such situations and with how some of the tabloids really go to town in making the most—indeed, the worst—of the sort of trouble that children have gotten into.
	For a few, there is the equally undesirable and counterproductive result where they acquire a sort of badge of honour; and that is no better. Finger pointing and targeting produces resentments and ultimately does absolutely nothing to achieve what we all really want—to prevent further low-level, ASBO-type activity. As I said earlier, punishment alone is meaningless unless it is accompanied by a reparative process that pays something back to the community. We know that it is counterproductive simply to target and punish children in this way. Some 39 per cent of ASBOs were issued to children last year. As I mentioned, there is a wealth of anecdotal evidence about the offensive press coverage and, as the noble Lord said, about this punishment being used in the cases of children with various kinds of disorder such as ADHD or Asperger's syndrome. Children I know very well from my school are being given ASBOs and drawn into the process. Those children are being penalised for their disabilities and marginalised even further.
	This is the law of unintended consequences—unforeseen, I am sure, by the Government. But the least we can do is to protect these children from being labelled, then named and shamed. I do not know anyone working with children either within or outwith the criminal justice system who has ever supported such an approach. Furthermore, there has been no detailed evaluation or assessment of what ASBOs actually achieve in outcomes. We know that they criminalise young people earlier, but do communities feel safer? Are communities safer? Are ASBOs effective in combating low-level crime? Until we know the answers to these and many other questions, these children and the communities in which they live are being served very badly by being named and shamed in this way, as are we all by being complicit in what is going on. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Linklater, for moving the amendment and giving us the benefit of her thoughts on this subject. It was a speech I have heard before, but no less interesting for that. The points contained in it are very interesting indeed. Ultimately, however, I do not find myself in great sympathy with the amendment, though I certainly understand the range of issues, and I appreciate the committed tone and the plea that come with it.
	The noble Lord, Lord Judd, in supporting the noble Baroness, put his finger on what is one of the more important issues for me: the desirability—indeed, the need—for us to express solidarity in society with the victims of crime, particularly of the sort of anti-social behaviour we have been discussing this afternoon.
	I acknowledge that there are difficulties, particularly in dealing with juveniles who can have their offensive behaviour glorified as a result of this process. I accept that there is concern about that. I also understand that there are times when the sort of publicity that some court cases involving young people give rise to can have a damaging effect and has the potential in some cases to make it harder for that behaviour to be addressed. We have to balance that against the potential for greater disorder by those in breach of anti-social behaviour orders, and the nuisance, aggravation and disturbance in communities that some of those individuals can create.
	It is unfortunate that in some senses we lack crisper statistical data with regard to the outcome of publicity, but then it is a difficult area in which to make a value judgment. It is also a difficult subject on which to collect hard data. I come to these issues with what I would describe as a rather common-sense approach. I live in a very pleasant area that is not far from the seafront, but which is adjacent to a part of my city that people sometimes see as a harbinger of particular sorts of crime, although that is actually an unfair reflection. What I often get from our local community is a claim that historically insufficient attention has been given to issues of anti-social behaviour, and a plea for relief. Part of that is a desire to see that young people are not only brought to book but are seen to be brought to book and are clearly and visibly identified in a way that is sensitive to community needs and aspirations and community protection. That is the nub of this whole issue.
	I want to make it clear too how the amendment would affect our legislative approach. As the noble Baroness well understands, it would simply repeal those sections of the Crime and Disorder Act that remove the automatic imposition of reporting restrictions but which give the courts discretion in the matter. That is the important point. That discretion operates in proceedings against juveniles who are in breach of ASBOs, or which relate to the making of ASBOs against juveniles on conviction of criminal offences.
	It has to be said that publicity of these proceedings is often an integral part of local agencies' efforts to tackle anti-social behaviour; there is no question of that. But there is no naming and shaming. ASBOs are made in open court and unless the court imposes restrictions, the media are entitled to report them, even if they involve young people. But it is for the court to decide whether to impose reporting restrictions. The courts recognise that these cases sometimes, perhaps often, need to be reported for two reasons: first, to let the community and the victims of anti-social behaviour know that something positive has been done to stop the abuse—that is important because communities need to have confidence in the criminal justice system—and, secondly, to publicise the prohibitions so that communities can help to enforce the order.
	Publicity is not aimed at punishing or shaming the individual. We need to remember at all times that the anti-social behaviour of juveniles and, indeed, adults—despite the statistics that are quoted we need to remember that adults are most subject to ASBOs—will have had a serious and lasting effect on other people's lives. As I said at the outset, the needs of such individuals need to be very carefully balanced with those of others in the community who have a right to be protected.
	However, the court can still impose reporting restrictions if it believes that the situation warrants it. The court will have had the opportunity to consider very carefully the circumstances of the individual—their background and any mental health problems from which they are suffering—because there is an absolute requirement on it to have regard to the welfare of the child or the young person.
	The existing legal framework—of which we have had several years' experience—is working well. Within that framework local authorities have a duty under various pieces of legislation to carry out assessments before the court comes to a conclusion. Support will be given if it is required. We always recommend a needs assessment to ensure that support services are in place. Although I heard what the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, said about the percentage of parenting orders, I would want to interrogate the data further before I passed judgment because they do not describe the full picture.
	Ultimately we need to remember that the sole purpose of the order is not just the young person's welfare. The harm that anti-social behaviour can inflict on an individual, a community and a locality has to be measured as well. If this Government have achieved one thing in the law and order field, it is to raise up the agenda and in people's minds the importance of tackling anti-social behaviour in a precise way as it affects people in their homes and communities. I believe that we have the balance about right. I have heard the arguments and have listened to individual cases being recited, but, on balance, we need to protect communities and people in their homes and make sure that lives which have previously been disrupted and, in many instances, frankly, made hell, are properly respected. So I have ultimately come to the conclusion that we must reject the amendment.

Lord Hylton: I notice that there has not been a single supporter of the status quo in the debate. Will the Government encourage calls to use their discretion to protect the anonymity not only of children and young people with learning difficulties and mental ill health, but of younger children altogether, even if older teenagers should perhaps sometimes be named and shamed?

Viscount Bridgeman: I will speak to Amendments Nos. 128 and 129 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Anelay, and I will comment on the other amendments in the group.
	As the noble Baroness, Lady Linklater, has highlighted, the purpose of the amendments to Clauses 21 and 22 are to write into the Bill that the purpose of using parenting orders and contracts is a dual one: to promote the well-being of the child as well as trying to prevent antisocial behaviour. The amendments aim to test the true voluntary nature of parenting contracts and to gain assurances that they will be used as a last resort. The noble Baroness has highlighted concerns with which we have great sympathy. This theme has been running throughout our discussions on this part of the Bill.
	Your Lordships' House has a strong reputation on children's issues, especially in the application of improving outcomes for the most vulnerable children and their families, predominantly guided by the principles set out in Section 10 of the ChildrenAct 2004. Indeed, in many ways these debates link into those that we had recently on the Childcare Bill, the Children and Adoption Bill and the Work and Families Bill, as well as those that are currently ongoing on the Education and Inspections Bill. All those Bills touched issues of disrupted family life, care and learning difficulties, which all feed into possible underlying reasons for anti-social behaviour. That only goes to highlight the vital need for cross-departmental co-operation on children and family matters. Out of interest, can the Minister, with her concern for joined-up government, indicate whether the different teams and Ministers on these Bills have met to discuss how this overarching subject is played out across them?
	Amendments Nos. 128 and 129 look at the detail of the proposed powers for social landlords and at whether it is appropriate for them to be able to use them on those who, in the words of the Bill, are "likely to engage" in anti-social behaviour under new Section 25B(1)(a)(ii), as inserted by Clause 21, or appear,
	"to reside...in the local authority's area",
	under new Section 26A(1)(b), as inserted by Clause 22.
	Amendment No. 128 tightens up the wording in new Section 25B(1)(a)(i), which enables the RSL to enter into a parenting contract with a parent if he has "reason to believe" that the child is likely to engage in such behaviour. Can the Minister inform the Committee what would constitute "reason to believe"?
	Definitions and thresholds of behaviour are widely drafted in this Bill. The drafting could mean that any parent becoming a tenant is pressured to sign a parenting contract to ensure that their child does not become involved in anti-social behaviour. I hope that this is not the Government's intention, but one could argue that the potential is always there. The definition is too broad. How will one judge whether the power is being used appropriately, and who is to check? We have already heard the arguments regarding lack of training, which is a theme that pervades discussions on the Bill.
	These amendments replace the wording so that the RSL could use the power only if the child had engaged in anti-social behaviour or "had threatened" to do so. I took this turn of phrase from the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, page 14, paragraph 1.34, regarding anti-social behaviour injunctions. It states that courts must be satisfied that the person against whom the injunction is sought is,
	"engaging, has engaged or threatens to engage",
	in such action. The use of "threatened" would be much more appropriate in this context, as well as offering some compromise between those who would like the power completely removed and those who would like it kept.
	Amendment No. 129, on the other hand, is a straight removal of the power of the RSL to apply for contracts in relation to children who appear,
	"to reside...in the local authority's area".
	The paragraph implies that an order could be made against a parent with whom the child or young person does not reside, and who may have little control over their behaviour. That raises many questions. For example, what criteria would be used to determine whether they appear to reside in the area? Should they be present every day or every weekend? Over what length of time should they be present? Will they be able to pin these children to particular parents, who may not have parental responsibility for them? Will the RSL have a duty to take disability into account in this context, as we discussed in relation to previous amendments? I hope that the Minister will give these points consideration in her reply.
	I will not reiterate the figures that the noble Baroness has already shared with the Committee, but it is worrying that, since April 2004, significantly fewer parenting contracts than parenting orders have been issued. If orders were being used as a last resort, it would be the other way around. I hope that the Minister can explain this discrepancy and take the time to outline the exact process via which an order can be made without a contract.
	Giving parenting contracts a statutory duty to improve the well-being of the child, particularly on the fourth area listed in the 2004 Act—the contribution made by them to society—enables a more holistic assessment to be made that may, in turn, flag up serious problems that can then be addressed in a focused and tailored manner. After all, the Government are continually reminding us that every case is different. In this respect, I support the principle behind these amendments.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I understand that to be the case. I reiterate that we think it is beneficial to intervene early before it has ripened to a stage where it is much more difficult to give the children and the parents the help and support they need.
	On Amendment No. 129, there may well be circumstances where the young person or child has an official address but spends a significant amount of time away from that location between two different addresses. One scenario is where there is a split parenting order and the child lives part of the time with one parent and part of the time with another. Sometimes, as an extended family member, they live part of the time with their grandmother or part of the time with their aunt. It would be wrong to say which is the primary address. Rather than be unable to give the child the help that they obviously need, the provision allows that flexibility.
	I re-emphasise that it is vital that proper assessment is made of the child. I assure the House that we will make it clear in guidance, when it is published, that that is how it should be dealt with. References to a person appearing to reside somewhere are not unusual. There are a number of precedents for that in anti-social behaviour legislation—for example, in the enforcement consultation and supervision provisions for orders, including anti-social behaviour orders, under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. They apply to adults, children and young people.
	It is really not in the interests of the child, the parent or the wider community to wait until a child is threatening to commit anti-social behaviour that has become more serious. We are concerned that "threatening" would make the provision far too narrow. One could be simplistic and say that "threatening" is likely to consist of a verbal threat, whereas "likely to engage" is not so limited. The expression "likely to engage" is well precedented in existing parenting control legislation. If a child is running around with a crowd of young people who are well known to engage in such behaviour and there may be reasons to believe that they are likely to engage in anti-social behaviour, there may be no express threat but it is quite clear that they are likely to do so.
	A parenting contract might include a requirement to attend a programme, as I said. There is a real opportunity here for us to do something that is truly supportive. From the debate on the previous group of amendments, I understand that there is concern about the number of parenting orders and about behavioural contracts. We have not talked enough about behavioural contracts. There is a whole issue about whether we are collating the information. A number of authorities enter into acceptable behavioural contracts, but they do not record how many are made. In many areas, there are more acceptable behaviour contracts than there are parenting contracts, or parenting orders, so we must consider all of that before making a judgment.
	There are now also the individual support orders that can go with ASBs. That will make an improvement. So our whole thrust is to intervene early and effectively to give the skills and the support to parents so that they can help better to manage their behaviour. I would therefore have hoped that the provisions would have been warmly welcomed by those in this House who I know care so passionately about supporting families and their children. I hope that I have given a great deal of comfort.

Baroness Linklater of Butterstone: The Minister indeed gives me a good deal of comfort and I know that, in many ways, not so much divides us. However, there is a division in the sense that the implication is that effective intervention to support parents and children at risk of ASBs starts with the parenting contract. Our position is that there is whole raft of possible interventions—the Minister just mentioned ABCs—that could and should be brought into play long before then so that real prevention is in place where it is needed.
	The Minister pointed out that there are all too many cases in which a family has reached the point of a parenting order with the kind of court involvement and coercion that that involves, and it is the first time that it has received help of any kind. On the one hand, that is greatly to be regretted, although I also acknowledge the great success, as I said in my opening remarks, and the real value and worth of parenting contracts and parenting orders.
	I intervened really to say that even a parenting contract is undesirable and perhaps heavy-handed, because all sorts of other forms of support are available, at least in theory, before such a process is brought to bear.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I shall take the noble Lord's drafting point first. It is right to say that the phraseology in this part of the Act is a familiar way of indicating an exercise of the court's discretion, but I understand the import of the noble Lord's concern. Parliamentary draftsmen over the years have grown familiar with distinguishing between the two and I think that the courts understand what that phrase means.
	The effect of the amendment would be to tie the hands of judges so that they could not use their discretion based on the facts of the individual case to decide whether a suspect should be remanded in custody or released on bail pending a full hearing. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, that it is a neat point as to whether people should not be charged with a substantive offence. Some grave offences are currently dealt with as anti-social behaviour because there is a desire, particularly with younger people, to intervene in that way rather than reach straight away for a criminal sanction. I was told of one case where it seemed very bold not to have taken criminal proceedings as it involved arson, burglary and a number of quite dangerous activities. In their wisdom, the practitioners decided that an anti-social behaviour order would be the better course. I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, would not want to dissuade people from taking a course which may be effective and more beneficial to young people and yet not necessarily involve criminal proceedings.
	We have strong concerns that requiring the courts to release a suspect on bail following an initial hearing, irrespective of how severe the alleged anti-social behaviour is, would address only the needs of the alleged perpetrator and neglect those of the victims and the wider community. We do not want to see situations where the court is powerless to stop a person who is alleged to have committed acts of serious harassment, possibly involving violence, returning to the community pending a full hearing.
	If we accepted these amendments, it would be very curious to know what message we would send to communities living under the blight of anti-social behaviour, and what messages we would send to the criminal justice system and, indeed, to judges on how they should use the provisions that we have made available to them. In seeking to deliver respect, it is critical that communities have faith in the ability of agencies to take swift action to protect people from serious harassment. One can imagine the fear and helplessness of neighbours where a suspect is arrested following serious anti-social conduct only to return next door a day or so later, pending a full hearing.
	We also have serious concerns about removing the power of the court to remand a suspect in custody where it has decided that a medical report should be obtained. Surely it is right that the court should retain discretion on what course of action is appropriate where it has concerns that the alleged conduct may have been caused in part or in full by a medical condition, especially where the court holds that that condition might give rise to further anti-social conduct if bail were granted.
	The noble Baroness is very familiar with the fact that the juvenile Bench is specifically trained to consider the best interests of the child and to have a more child-centred approach. In the adult court we can trust judges to make appropriate orders. I hope that with that explanation, the noble Baroness will be a little happier than she was.

Lord Ramsbotham: I wish to oppose the Motion that Clause 28 stand part of the Bill and to speak to Amendments Nos. 139, 144, 148 to 171 inclusive and to Amendment No. 195.
	The aim of the amendments is quite simply to strike out the words "and custody" and any reference to Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons from the Bill, and to try to persuade the Government to think again before committing what I and a number of other Members in all parts of this House and the other House quite honestly regard as a wilful act of extreme folly. I do so against an unfortunate background for a Bill of such importance. I quote from Miss Lynne Featherstone in the other place:
	"It is a great tragedy that we did not have time to debate the inspectorates. The changes to the prison inspectorate hold dangers for prisoners in future. That inspectorate casts a light where no light shines through its expertise and independence, both of which will be compromised in a joint inspectorate. The chief inspector of prisons, Anne Owers, said that it would be a dilution of all the special protection for prisoners. Well trained prison inspectors can spot human rights abuses in a way that will not be possible if the inspectorates are merged. I am sorry that we did not have time to discuss a joint amendment to provide that prisons were not included. Prisoners need special arrangements to protect them.
	"Sadly, we are now dependent on the other place to put into the Bill all the proposals that the Government would not accept—amendment after amendment ... We tried to work with the Government but all our good work and good intentions were rejected, so it is with a heavy heart that I leave it to the other place to make amends".—[Official Report, Commons, 10/5/06; col. 435.]
	We now come to the making of the amends. I have mentioned before in this House that I find a difficulty in having been Chief Inspector of Prisons, because of the suggestion that I would say what I am going to say anyway. I am not going to do that; I am going to call in support of my amendment the words of other people, because that perhaps is more powerful.
	In working up to today, I have been absolutely staggered at the size and variety of my postbag and the numbers of people who have telephoned and spoken to me. Three people who I had never met before contacted me on my way to the House today. Last night, it was teachers, governors and parents at a granddaughter's school. Prison staff, prisoners and many who work in prisons are all asking a very simple question: "How could they be so stupid?". What business would throw away its only source of independent and objective quality assurance? As a solider, I honestly cannot comprehend throwing away an internationally recognised asset at a time when the criminal justice system needs all the help that it can get, particularly when that asset is proven and trusted by the public to produce unfudged facts about what is actually happening rather than what people would like to happen.
	I have said this before but, sadly, the Government's record of listening to an independent and objective inspection and to the recommendations and advice that it gives is not good. I am somewhat cynical about the protestations in the policy statement. Only recently, all the warnings about foreign national prisoners were ignored, and look what happened. Last week, we had the Feltham inquiry, which again showed that warnings had not been listened to. I just hope that the attempt to put the inspectorate of prisons into a merged group is not a deliberate attempt to silence the inspectorate.
	The record of the prison inspectorate includes exposing what the Prison Service's own regulation and audit did not. Sadly, it is followed always by the explanation that since the inspection things are better, so we should not worry. There were pregnant women in chains in Holloway; assaults by prison staff in the segregation unit at Wormwood Scrubs; outrageous behaviour in the segregation unit at Wandsworth; and mental health treatment that was utterly disgraceful in Brixton, to which I brought the director-general so that he could see it for himself and not doubt it. There is a terrible performance by a number of young offenders' establishments. Most recently, Woodhill prison was so bad that it had to change the governor, who had been meant to be running that prison.
	So I come to the suggestion that all the talk that everything will become stronger and better under a merger is viewed with considerable cynicism. I ask everyone who is responsible for that policy to make certain that they understand that this proposal is flawed, because it does not come from a deliberate examination of the inspection of the criminal justice system or any suggestion that the prisons inspectorate has failed. It comes from a statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget speech. The name of the game has been given away in page 22 of the policy statement about the new inspectorate, which states:
	"The Government is minded to move to a single inspectorate".
	In the Army, we had a phrase, "situating the appreciation". It meant that you decided what you were going to do and then you wrote a paper around that, explaining why that was the only suitable course of action. When I examined that policy statement, I discovered that there were eight options, of which only one was chosen. But option 7 is perfectly reasonable—it is to leave things as they are as regards prisons inspection and to merge the other four inspectorates. I can see the value of merging the other four, because they are the inspectorate of the Crown Prosecution Service, the Courts Service, the police and the probation service, and they have to work together on a day-to-day basis. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that their inspections should be put more closely together. However, the inspection of prisons and the treatment and conditions of prisoners have nothing to do with that.
	When I went on inspections, I used to take with me a team consisting of a psychiatrist, a GP, nurses, pharmacists, dentists, drug treatment specialists, education inspectors from Ofsted and the Adult Learning Inspectorate, social services inspectors—if I went to see juveniles or mother-and-baby units—health and safety and fire inspectors, civil engineers and experts in gardens and farms. Not one was from the Crown Prosecution Service or the courts, and only occasionally did I take people from the probation service, although I worked with them on thematic reviews. I once took a policeman with me when I went to see the work of the RUC in the Maze. I also worked with the DTI's inspectorate of the security industry in looking at matters to do with private prisons and escort arrangements.
	Therefore, I would be grateful if the Minister could say just how she envisages the time of the new deputy chief inspector of justice, community safety and custody working, other than their going on doing what is done now to inspect prisons, as required, and making available from time to time people to do other things, which I did when inspecting social services locations or helping elsewhere—in other words, maintaining the status quo.
	In Section 52 of the Prison Act 1952, there is already a perfectly good description of how inspections should be carried out and it does not need to be changed. The Act was amended when I took over responsibility for detention and immigration centres. If you want the Chief Inspector of Prisons to take on the inspection of cells in police stations and courts, why not make a simple amendment? It does not need a great merger.
	It is also of concern that a number of words are being lobbed out—I have mentioned one, which is "modern". What does the Minister mean by "modern"? In her introduction to the policy statement, she states that she wants to have inspections that are "strongly led". Does she not think that prisons inspection has been strongly led? She says that she wants it to be "forward looking". How can it be more forward-looking? Why has so little attention been paid to the recommendations? I do not know.
	There is another confusion under the new proposals. Paragraph 265 of the Explanatory Notes says:
	"In contract to inspection of a defined list of institutions the Chief Inspector will be under a duty to inspect the operation of certain broadly defined systems".
	That is not the purpose of prison inspection; it is all about institutions. Frankly, I am at a loss to say anything other than that the Government were minded to act because of what the Chancellor said, and they wrote a policy statement to satisfy his words, not to satisfy the needs which have been identified for so long.
	I have spoken only about the inspection of prisons but an almost more serious matter, which I mentioned at Second Reading, is now upon us—that is, our requirement to have an independent monitoring organisation to satisfy the protocol on the prevention of torture, which we have signed. We have come up to the requirement according to all the officials who are responsible for seeing that that independent arrangement is in place. The only place in the world where it is in existence is here, so why are we throwing it away? The report of our own Joint Committee on Human Rights states very clearly:
	"In light of the above ... the absorption of HM's Chief Inspector of Prisons into a single criminal justice inspectorate, without the specific guarantees that we have mentioned, would not be compatible with the requirement of the Optional Protocol ... that there be independent monitoring of places of detention".
	If we have it, why throw it away? We would only have to invent another, and that seems to me utterly pointless.
	On the same subject, the president of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture has said that the task of inspecting the treatment and conditions of persons deprived of their liberty is of a different order from inspections of other activities carried out in relation to persons not in custody, and that it would be ironic if, at the very time when the world looks to the United Kingdom for a prime example of an independent prison inspection mechanism, the UK were to decide to radically alter this model of good practice.
	I could go on, but I hope that, when the Minister replies, she does not repeat what people have been saying to me—that this new inspectorate is going to be so much stronger and better. I ask her not to pretend that a deputy chief inspector of justice, community safety and custody, who is subordinate to a chief inspector and to responsible Ministers and government policy, will be stronger and more independent than a standalone chief inspector who is responsible for arranging both content and method of inspection of all those held in custody, with direct access to Ministers and the public whenever he or she requires.
	There is an old saying in the Army: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it". I am not speaking about my time but about my admirable successor, who has done, and continues to do, such a wonderful job. It would be an absolute crime to waste something that we have and, in particular, to remove a priceless weapon from the hands of Ministers—that is, independent and objective quality assurance of what goes on now and for which they are responsible. That is why I make no bones about these amendments sweeping away all reference to the prisons inspectorate and recommending that we go back to option 7, while by all means merging the other inspectorates. I beg to move.

Baroness Linklater of Butterstone: I speak on behalf of my noble friend Lord Dholakia. First, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, on powerfully representing a view that I think is shared by many of us in this Chamber. What I say will in some ways echo what he has said much more eloquently than I could do.
	We have returned to an aspect of the Bill which, for those involved with the work of the Prison Service and penal reform, has caused the greatest concern, confusion and dismay. We have been considering the proposition that the prisons inspectorate is the most highly acclaimed internationally of all our inspectorates, as well as being the most highly respected institution at home. It is recognised for its standards, achievements and, above all, its independence, but it is to be subsumed into an amalgam of five criminal justice inspectorates. This causes confusion and dismay because it seems to jettison such a rare and valuable resource in the name of modernisation, rationalisation, efficiency, unification, a holistic approach, and giving the public the best possible service. I am paraphrasing the words of Charles Clarke last March.
	That demonstrates a fundamental failure to understand the nature of the prison inspectorate, to recognise the essential and vital differences between its role and that of other inspectorates, or to see that it already represents a precious beacon of best practice. Instead, the clause proposes the diminution of everything that the inspectorate for. My parallel with what happened after the Seeborne committee and what that did to social services is not as wide of the mark as was suggested by the Minister when we debated this at Second Reading.
	When different departments or inspectorates are combined with notions of unification and a holistic approach, by definition it means that differences in areas of expertise become blurred. Over time these crucial differences are gradually lost. That is a tragedy. The essential difference is based on the fact that the inspectorate is looking at the treatment and condition of people who have been deprived of their liberty, which, as Dr Silvio Casale—the president of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture—said,
	"is fundamentally different from other criminal justice measures and has different legal and moral implications".
	It requires specialised skills and experience, and is critically dependent on its absolute independence from government—its chief inspector coming from outside the service—so that it can criticise policy as well as practice. It can use its own criteria and methodology, rely on unannounced inspections and visit and inspect on its own terms at least twice every five years.
	If the clause stays part of the Bill we will be left with a very atypical, diminished element of a much larger whole. The independence, so highly prized, will be circumscribed in a variety of ways. Clause 27(8) allows Ministers to,
	"specify functions, organisation and matter that should not be subject to inspection either in whole or in part".
	Clause 30 allows Ministers to control the time and resources of the inspectorate by directing inspections on specific matters. Clause 30(3) states:
	"In exercising any of his functions the Chief Inspector shall have regard to such aspects of government policy as the responsible ministers may direct".
	That is not all, but it is among other clauses which seem to amount to the complete undermining of its independence, its ability to criticise policy as well as practice and use of its own criteria and methodology.
	Anne Owers has made a statement that until 2008:
	"Ministers have said that they want us ... to ensure that the current extent, robustness and methodology of custodial inspection is preserved and incorporated into the new ... Inspectorate".
	Unless these clauses are amended, I fail to see how that will be possible.
	Finally, I reiterate my deep concern about the future inspections of children and young people in custody. This is a still further specialised area that is treated in a specialised way within the prisons inspectorate itself. There is a specific team which deals only with YOIs, using separate criteria, a different set of expectations and a child-centred approach. Those of us who have worked with vulnerable children know that it takes great skill and specialised experience to take on this sort of work. We currently have that.
	Indeed, I have come to the view that where our child prisons—the STCs—are concerned, in which inspections are now carried out by CSCI because the children are so very young, it might be that the specialised team of the prisons inspectorate would be even better placed than CSCI to carry out inspections, because it understands custody as others cannot. Had STCs been inspected with such rigour and candid, open criticism of findings in the past, I wonder, in the dark watches of the night, if some of the fearful practices uncovered by the independent report of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—strip searching, solitary confinement and restraint of children as young as 12—might have been stopped sooner and a life saved. What will be the future of this work in the brave new world of combined inspectorates?
	In the light of the range of arguments and depth of feeling this clause has engendered, I hope that the Government will carefully rethink its position on this amendment.

Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen: Briefly, I support Amendments Nos. 148 and 149 in particular, and what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Linklater.
	Placing five inspectorates under one umbrella is foolhardy, to say the least. Today, however, I shall speak only of the prison inspectorate, covered by these amendments. The inspectorate of the Prison Service is vital to the criminal justice system. What else has brought what is wrong in our prisons to our attention over the years, as well as what is right? The current prison inspector, Anne Owers, has exposed some realties of prison life, warts and all. She is an independent specialist. If this inspectorate is subsumed into others, that specialism will inevitably be diminished, as will future inspections and the respect for human rights the inspectorate upholds.
	In another place, my honourable friend Hazel Blears, when a Home Office Minister, said:
	"we have given an undertaking that we will not abolish the role of the prisons inspector until we are satisfied that the new combined inspectorate can deal with such issues properly".—[Official Report, Commons, 6/3/06; cols 690-91.]
	That day will never come.
	Finally, I consulted the Prison Officers' Association, which represents prison officers and others in prison establishments, on these proposals. One might think that it would welcome its inspectorate being diminished, but it does not. Their general secretary, Brian Caton, wants to continue working with Anne Owers as he does now, to ensure that outrages, as outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, do not occur in our prisons in the future.

Lord Mayhew of Twysden: I hope that this group of amendments will either persuade the Government to adopt them, or that they will ultimately be carried. I am fortified anew in that view by powerful speeches; not only that of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, but also the two speeches that were sympathetic to it from both sides of the House.
	For the past two decades, the existence of the independent, standalone Chief Inspector of Prisons has been celebrated here at home and greatly admired abroad. The reason is clear: the post and the people who have held it have been able to shine lights into corners where none would otherwise shine and where all too often horrible conditions of ill-treatment have been perpetrated in our name on people deprived of their freedom with no one else to help them. That is why this post and the way in which it has been filled has been celebrated at home and greatly admired abroad. The chief inspectors have gone where they wanted and spoken to whomever they wanted. They reported direct and publicly—which was very important—to the Home Secretary on what they found. In doing so, they have very often been a thorn in the ample flesh of Ministers in successive Governments, which is why I strongly suspect that the Government want to reign them in through the Bill.
	Of course, Ministers do not put it quite like that. Like other noble Lords, I have been looking at the Government's policy statement Inspection Reform: Establishing an Inspectorate for Justice, Community Safety and Custody. In the summary on page 3, the Government say:
	"A focused, joined up and streamlined inspection regime is needed if inspection is to fulfil its aims and provide the independent scrutiny required by Ministers".
	That may be what is required by Ministers, but I judge that that is not what is required by prisoners, those who administer prisons or those who are concerned by their performance. The noble Baroness, Lady Gibson, described the views of the Prison Service. I am not aware that in any of those quarters there has been any call for the activities of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, or his predecessors to be streamlined. It is a frightening choice of words: one streamlines in order to secure a smooth passage and to minimise resistance.
	As for focus, I do not believe that conditions in prisons are of secondary importance. It is conditions in prisons, not the system—as the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has just put it—that require the inspector's exclusive focus. However much turbulence the announced and unstreamlined arrival of the inspector may occasion, surely we can all agree that prisons are quite different in character from the other 10 inspectorates at present in the public sector and that they always will be. That can be seen from the extraordinary inappropriateness to prisons of the following sentence in the policy statement:
	"A single inspectorate will highlight the perspective of the service user by providing a single fulcrum for assurance and improvement in every aspect of their experience of the delivery of the system".
	That is a sentence worthy of a prize from a chief inspector of reach-me-down clichés.
	I do not think that prisoners—whether or not they view themselves as "service users"—will feel reassured in any significant way by the proposed change to the system that has produced Judge Tumim, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, and now Miss Anne Owers as inspectors of courage and gloriously unstreamlined independence. Instead, will they not see—and be right to see—the heavy hand of the Chancellor? After all, it was he who announced in March last year that the Government intended to reduce the public sector inspectorates from 11 to four. Why the Chancellor? Was the Home Secretary not available that day?
	I respectfully say that the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, was the most devastating that I have yet heard in this House. I trust that the Government will think again.

Lord Dubs: I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, the arguments that he used and, indeed, the arguments that have been heard around the Committee this evening. I should like briefly to add my thoughts.
	I doubt very much whether a single Member of the House will support the Government on this issue. I would be very surprised indeed if one did. These are important issues. I have always felt that at a time of an ever increasing prison population, with reports of violence, racism, suicides and murders in our prisons, the one assurance we have is of a highly efficient and motivated chief inspector of prisons who will go and fearlessly report on what she or he has seen. I felt slightly more relaxed about the state of our prisons because of the work of successive chief inspectors. They have exposed what was going on, which has led to improvements in the way our prisons are run.
	That is not to say that more improvements are not necessary, but chief inspectors have the power to do that. They have the power to do that because of their total independence and their ability to report directly to government and to the wider world, and because they have not been constrained or trammelled by some of the bureaucratic rigmarole which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, has quoted so effectively.
	It has been a strength of this country and our penal system that we have welcomed—until now—reports of chief inspectors of prisons that have been distinctly uncomfortable for government. Surely, as a country we should not be ashamed of that; we should say we are proud of it because it is such an essential safeguard.
	I can understand the words that are used by the Government, but I cannot understand the reasons for this proposal. And it is my government. I have supported this Government on most things since 1997. I feel absolutely dismayed and let down that they are being utterly silly. I can think of no good reason—I have heard none and I have read none—why this should be the case. I am depressed at the thought that we will have to have this debate. Let us hope that before we get to Report stage the Government will think again.
	There is no chance that this provision will pass through this House. I have yet to find anybody who supports the Government, certainly not inside the Chamber but outside it. I say to the Government that many of their most loyal supporters will feel compelled to vote against them unless there is a change of heart.

Baroness Stern: I support the amendment. I begin by making it clear that although the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, may feel he is in an awkward position and in some way is special pleading because he is talking about a job that he held, he has no reason to feel that at all. I have not met anyone who sees any sense in this proposal.
	I should like briefly to bring to the discussion the perspective of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member. The Joint Committee dealt with this proposal in its tenth report. It noted that Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons,
	"is an important part of the machinery for upholding the human rights of prisoners and ensuring compliance with human rights standards in prisons".
	The inspectorate, the committee said, is,
	"in large part a human rights monitoring body—a non-judicial means of preventing future violations of the human rights of prisoners".
	The committee went on to say:
	"The effectiveness of the system for inspecting and monitoring prisons therefore directly affects the UK's ability to meet its international obligations".
	The Joint Committee was also concerned about whether the new inspectorate arrangements would meet the United Kingdom Government's obligations under the optional protocol against torture, which the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham mentioned and which the UK Government have ratified. The convention has come into force and we now need to prepare for it.
	The committee asked whether the new arrangements meet the requirement for an independent national preventive mechanism to inspect places of detention. In pursuit of its inquiry, the committee raised a number of points with the Government and received assurances that the new arrangements would assure independence and continued effectiveness. In fact, in their response to the committee, the Government argued that the reformed inspectorate would be more independent, more transparent and more robust for two reasons: that the power given to the Chief Inspector of Justice, Community Safety and Custody to require Ministers to lay any report before Parliament and by making it explicit that the chief inspector shall publish every report in whatever way he or she wishes.
	It will not surprise the Committee to know that the Joint Committee on Human Rights was not convinced and concluded:
	"We cannot share the Government's confidence about the future in the absence of explicit statutory provision underpinning these assurances".
	The committee set out six specific guarantees that seemed to it to be required to be written into the Bill. I shall run through them quickly. There was a requirement that the inspection function in relation to prisons be carried out by actual visits to places of detention, because that is not currently clear. There was a requirement that there should be regular visits, because that is not clear. There was a requirement for stronger guarantees of independence, including removal of the power of ministerial direction; an express power in the Bill of unannounced inspection; an express power for the inspector to set his or her own standards; and an express requirement that prisons inspection be carried out by reference to human rights standards. None of those is in the Bill but they seemed to the Joint Committee to be the minimum necessary to ensure independence.
	The committee was of the view that without those guarantees the new inspectorate would not be compatible with the requirements of the optional protocol and that there would be a greater risk of breaches of the human rights of prisoners, especially the right to life and the right not to be subject to inhumane or degrading treatment. Here, one is reminded of the warning given by the chief inspector, Anne Owers, in 2002, about the threat to life because of the absence of a proper detoxification regime at Styal Prison, and the subsequent six deaths of women prisoners there, after which a detoxification regime was introduced; and the attention that she has drawn to the frequent strip-searching of children under 18, who may have come from a background of physical and sexual abuse, which is very relevant to the need to prevent inhumane and degrading treatment. Whenever people are locked away, completely under the control of others, independent and effective inspection is needed. The Joint Committee on Human Rights felt that the Government's proposals would not provide that safeguard.
	Much has been made of the benefit that amalgamation would bring in enabling inspection across the criminal justice system—the joined-up fulcrum to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, referred. I have frequently pondered this since it was first suggested and I am still unclear what on earth it could mean. I am moved to agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Gibson, that the whole amalgamation is foolhardy. I can see all sorts of linkages that require working together in all directions. The Chief Inspector of Prisons may find hundreds of mentally ill people in prison who should be transferred to hospital and may want to have a joint project with the Department of Health in that regard. The probation service may discover failings in resettlement work in prisons and see benefits in joint work with the prisons inspectorate—in fact, it has; it did and a thematic report was produced. The Chief Inspector of Prisons may find prisons full of inadequate, sick people convicted of minor offences and have questions about why they were prosecuted. A joint study with the Crown Prosecution Service is perfectly possible.
	That is the only argument that the Government have made for this merger: that something that is joined up will be better than something that is not joined up. Can the Minister say what inspections need to be done across the whole criminal system that need to involve the Chief Inspector of Prisons and have such overriding importance that they call for this massive reorganisation, which has so little support?

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: I regret the lack of scrutiny in the other place of the matters to which the amendments refer. No doubt there was a reason why time was unavailable. I have little personal experience of these matters, although when my late noble kinsman was Home Secretary, he had a reputation in the Prison Service of asking questions on prison visits that it had not expected a Home Secretary to ask. I believe that verdict was intended to be a compliment.
	I did, however, have the privilege of chairing the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee in the 1997 to 2001 Parliament. We were a committee that, in a troubled province, had a range of opinion that stretched from Peter Robinson MP, Andrew Hunter MP, then the MP for Basingstoke, at one end, to Ken Livingstone, then the MP for Brent, but we divided on amendments only twice in four years on a long range of reports. One of our reports was on the Northern Ireland Prison Service. We had as advisers most distinguished academic experts on prison subjects from the University of Cambridge and from KCL. The report was unanimous. A crucial witness was the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, in his then capacity. After the report was published, the then Permanent Secretary of the Northern Ireland Office, with long Home Office experience on prison matters, thanked me for the agreed agenda that we had laid out for him and the director of the Northern Ireland Prison Service. There was no resentment of what we had said, or of what the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, had said to us that had powerfully influenced us. I shall be most attentive to what the Minister says, but she will need to be phenomenally persuasive.
	I remark in conclusion that it is a nice irony that the Whip on the Bench during the presentation by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, of his amendments was the Whip who normally answers to your Lordships' House on Treasury matters.

The Earl of Sandwich: I have a feeling that the Minister will say that we are mourning a death prematurely, but I do not know how she can say that after hearing such expert information, especially from my noble friends who have served in this area. From time to time, I have contributed to asylum Bills and debates on asylum. I do not know how, without the first-hand knowledge and experience of the prison inspectorate, we would ever have been able to argue the case for asylum seekers. Of course, this will continue, but we know that this widely-established and deserved international reputation is bound to be seriously diluted under the Bill.
	My noble friend says that he is somewhat cynical about this new measure, which is no surprise because he has been a very model of an inspector. He is now a model of modesty when he defends his own, old, vital position. What evidence can the Minister provide to prove her faith in the system and that the inspectorate still can survive, and show that this Bill can gold-plate such a remarkable institution? Everything seems to point to the contrary.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I wish to speak in strong support of the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, to preserve the current status of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons. First, I pay tribute to the work done week by week, quietly, and with non-partisan determination, by those at the inspectorate who provide a detailed, objective and expert assessment of our prisons and immigration detention facilities. The Government's plans to subsume it within a conglomerate of criminal justice inspectorates are misguided. I come to that conclusion after listening to the debates that have taken place on this matter over the past months, both within and outside Parliament.
	I have tested the views put forward by both sides of the argument against a set of questions that I believe any Government must consider when they plan administrative reorganisations on the grand scale. I shall set out some of those questions. Is the organisation functioning effectively now? What is it doing wrong that can be remedied only by structural change? What is the added value that it will gain from structural change that cannot be gained in any other way? What will be lost by change? Is that loss critical to the long-term effectiveness of the organisation? Is there an alternative route to improving the function of the organisation—one that on this occasion would not have the disadvantages of the Government's proposals? The debate today has been a devastating critique of the Government's plans, put forward from around the Committee. We have heard a range of views explaining why the Government's plans are deeply flawed and why they have failed to pass the test put by the questions that I have considered.
	Subsuming the prisons inspectorate within a wider parent body is inappropriate. It would significantly damage its effectiveness. There are alternative, preferable options for improving its operation within the criminal justice family, without damage to the prisons inspectorate itself. In opening, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, drew our attention to the inelegantly titled Option 7 in the policy document.
	The Government have consistently recognised that the Inspectorate of Prisons is a beacon of excellence. It simply does not make sense to subsume it within a system that the Government have said is not operating as effectively as the independent prisons inspectorate does. Why would people of the current and past calibre of chief inspector wish to be deputy to a new portmanteau chief inspector when they cannot speak out independently or have independent access to Ministers? The Government have argued that the weakness of the current system is that the criminal justice system acts in silence. Of course it is important that the inspectorates have a dialogue, but there are perfectly sensible ways in which inspections could proceed effectively without combining the inspectorates. When the chief inspectors of the various services got together with Ofsted in 1999 and asked the Government to fund a secretariat that would co-ordinate joint inspections and process joint inspection reports, the Government refused to provide funding. That is a route which would provide a solution for the Government.
	We have deep concerns about Clause 30(3), which states that,
	"the Chief Inspector shall have regard to such aspects of government policy as the responsible ministers may direct".
	It is clear that that would prevent the chief inspector speaking out against and criticising the Government in certain circumstances. The Government's response from Fiona Mactaggart in another place was to say:
	"Ministers will not have the power to direct the chief inspector other than where a statute provides for it".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee D, 28/3/06; col. 246.]
	That is exactly the point of Clause 30(3). This statute gives Ministers a potentially wide power of intervention. Any assurance that a Minister currently in office would not use the power of course would be accepted, but it cannot bind future Secretaries of State and Administrations. We really do not think that this is a sufficient measure, and there have to be guarantees in the statute.
	The independence of the Inspectorate of Prisons is paramount. In another place the Government maintained that this can be achieved by creating a statutory office of the inspector, but we simply do not see why that in itself would guarantee the independence of the position. Many statutory offices are created by legislation, but that does not necessarily mean that they are independent.
	The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, also referred to the important matter of the UN convention in his opening remarks. I read with interest the statement made by Anne Owers on 28 June. She expressed her particular concern that the Joint Committee on Human Rights and other international experts do not believe that the current provisions for the new inspectorate will be compatible with the optional protocol to the UN Convention on Torture which came into effect last month. We share that concern.
	In conclusion, I argue that the Government's proposals pose significant risks to the future independence and excellence of the prisons inspectorate. Indeed, the Minister in another place, Fiona Mactaggart, recognised that there are risks. She maintained that the Government had,
	"put a lot of energy into the design of the inspectorate to minimise those risks".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee D, 28/3/06; col. 252.]
	But I argue that significant risks remain, risks that must not be taken, which is why Clause 28 should not stand part of the Bill. My hope is that the Government will take the opportunity of the Summer Recess to think again on this matter and come back on Report and agree with noble Lords that the right thing to do is amend this Bill and thus preserve the independence and current status of the inspectorate.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I have rarely been showered with such compliments. "Extreme folly", "stupid", "silly", "without light"—the compliments flowed from all around the Committee.
	I say straightaway that it is no part of the Government's intention to restrict, limit or water down the independence of the inspectorate. If we were trying to silence the inspectorate, I respectfully suggest that this would be a very odd method to adopt. It would be odd, too, in view of the individuals that we have historically chosen to fulfil the role, in relation not only to prisons but to the Crown Prosecution Service, probation and police. All the inspectorates hold one thing in common: they are led by rigorous, independent free spirits who do not restrain themselves one iota from being not only one thorn but a number of thorns in the side of any Government—and I welcome those thorns. It is of absolute importance that any Government should be assured that the rigour and vigour necessary to undertake robust and effective inspection remains. They are, as the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, rightly said, the stuff of which security is made.
	If we had wished to choose a puppet—someone who would bow to the Government's will—it would be odd indeed to have chosen the names of Tumin, Ramsbotham and Owers. No matter which complexion of Government we have benefited from, nothing in our history indicates that the Government of the day are so foolish as to choose someone who lacks that vital component of independence of spirit. If that was our intent, we have failed in a consummate way.
	Let me put to rest the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, that this is an attempt to silence the inspectorate, and the suggestion made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, that we in some way intend to rein it in. The noble and learned Lord and I have both laboured in the job of lawyers and he knows that we look for evidence—and the evidence is that we have always failed to do that because we have never tried to do it. I can assure the Committee that it is no part of our intention to do that now.
	Let us look at the issues that have arisen. All around the Committee it is said that we do not need to change—the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, said, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it"—and others say that this immutable position must remain. Regrettably, we are seeking to deal with a 21st-century difficulty with a 20th-century model. In moving forward, we have to look at the most effective way of guaranteeing the rights of individuals, the improvement of the conditions in which they are held and a better understanding of the fact that the criminal justice system is now interlinked.
	Why do I say that? Because before 2003—and I go back to the report of Lord Justice Auld—it was clear that the criminal justice system was not working well in unison. Each part individually was of superb construction. I would compare it to the erstwhile Olympic relay team that the Americans were blessed with: fast, the best in its field, effective, superb, a thing of beauty. But it lacked one essential component: an understanding that in a relay you have to have a baton, that the baton has to be passed from individual to individual, and that the only way you win is by going across the line. We needed to create a quintessentially British relay team—perhaps not quite as fashionable or as sleek, but knowing a number of things: first, what a baton looks like; secondly, to whom it must be given; and, thirdly, what the finishing line looks like and where to go through it.
	That was one of the problems with which the criminal justice system was faced. We have done a lot to bring its components closer together—the creation of the National Criminal Justice Board, the creation of the local criminal justice boards, working together through the crime and disorder reduction partnerships, and the work with the local strategic partnerships have all played their part. However, we have also learnt that the management of offenders has to be end-to-end, and that if we are to inspect the system and the way in which individual offenders and victims move through it, we have to understand it end-to-end.
	Inspecting in silos will no longer be a proper way of inspecting the system, because things have now changed. Decisions in relation to the criminal justice system are made at different points and are interconnected. Now the Crown Prosecution Service is responsible for charging. The role which the courts play is significantly different after the 2003 Act. Probation and prisons are no longer separate—they have to work in unison if we are to have end-to-end management. It is proposed that the probation service should have the role of offender manager. Part of the period will be spent in custody; part will be spent in the community. How that works will be of critical importance. The role which education, health and the other factors play within prison and how they are linked to the community becomes more important. Inspecting those issues in addition to, not instead of, the role which is currently played by each of the inspectorates becomes of additional importance.
	It is not our proposal to diminish in any way the specific role currently undertaken by the Inspector of Prisons. I hear what is said about the Inspector of Prisons and I endorse it, but I endorse too the high international regard in which our inspectors of police, probation and courts are similarly held. It would be wrong to say that the inspectorate should be differentiated in that way, albeit that we celebrate what has been done by our inspectors.
	We have fully registered the concerns that have been expressed about the position of the Chief Inspector of Prisons. We recognise and will preserve the vital role that she plays in safeguarding the human rights of prisoners and detainees. However, we need an inspection regime that looks at the offender management process from start to finish through custodial and community settings. A single chief inspector for the justice system will be able to say unequivocally what is wrong with the system as a whole and what needs to be done to put it right, especially at the joins where the activities of a different agency interface. For example, it is no longer enough to assess the provision for an offender's educational needs by reference to the facilities available in prison without considering provision in the wider community before and after custody, as I have sought to explain. We recognise that dedicated inspection of treatment and conditions of prisoners is indispensable to protect human rights.
	We have therefore preserved in full, as a distinct duty of the new chief inspector, the existing statutory remit of the Chief Inspector of Prisons. That will ensure that this special form of inspection remains a priority. The new chief inspector will have a statutory duty, when staffing the inspectorate, to maintain sufficient expertise and experience relating to the systems and organisations inspected. The new chief inspector will continue, like the Chief Inspector of Prisons, to be able to set the criteria for inspections. We can give an assurance that prison inspection will be in terms of domestic and international human rights standards rather than service standards or government targets. The new chief inspector, not Ministers, will set inspection criteria, and he or she will be entirely free to set criteria derived from core legal and human rights, as is currently the case with the Chief Inspector of Prisons. There will be no change. That will enable the United Kingdom to continue to meet in full its international obligations in relation to prisons.
	The Committee will note, too, the requirement to consult the chief inspector before using the power of direction, which must be done in even the most urgent cases. We expect that the chief inspector will bring his or her independent voice to any such consultation. The new chief inspector will continue, like the Chief Inspector of Prisons, to make unannounced inspections as he or she sees fit. The inspector will also, like the Chief Inspector of Prisons, be a statutory independent officeholder appointed by the Queen. He or she will report directly to Ministers and will be able to publish reports and require them to be laid before Parliament. He or she will be free to criticise government policy if that is producing the wrong outcomes for prisoners and detainees.

Baroness Billingham: I want to clarify the points that my noble friend is making. The department seems to be saying that everything that the Chief Inspector of Prisons now does will remain with the new inspector. My worry is that there are four other inspectorates that this super-human being will have to look after. I cannot really see how that is going to work.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I wish to speak to Amendments Nos. 139A and 142A, standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Dholakia.
	These amendments concern the new inspectorate's—should it come into being—inspection of race equality. Amendment No. 139A would insert a new clause on a race equality duty. The amendment states:
	"The Chief Inspector shall ensure that inspections and all other functions are carried out with regard to race equality and in particular the general statutory duty under section 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976 (c. 74) (specified authorities: general statutory duty)".
	Amendment No. 142A states:
	"Report by the Secretary of State on race equality
	The Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament an annual report on the progress of inspection and regulation bodies in respect of race equality and in particular the general statutory duty under section 71 of the Race Relations Act 1976 (c. 74) (specified authorities: general statutory duty)".
	I am grateful for the advice that we have received on the amendments from the Commission for Racial Equality.
	Part 4 gives the new chief inspector a general duty to inspect the courts system, the criminal justice system and the immigration enforcement system as well as a specific duty to inspect prisons, including the treatment and conditions of prisoners, as we have heard very clearly this afternoon. This part of the Bill also contains powers to confer additional functions on the chief inspector, as well as making provision for inspection powers and reports by him.
	Although the present five criminal justice inspectorates are subject to the general and specific duties, they have different interpretations of what this means in practice for inspections. The interim report of the Commission for Racial Equality's investigation in June 2004 had considered a sample of 15 police race equality schemes and had assessed 14 of them as non-compliant. In the light of this, in the autumn of 2004, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary accepted that its duty to promote race equality included action to address such shortcomings within the police service. It is developing an electronic tool for forces to assess their own progress on delivering the duty.
	The other inspectorates, however, have not had this experience and interpret the duty differently. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Probation—HMIP—has conducted very effective thematic inspections on race equality, but not with an emphasis on the duty. In individual inspections it assesses outcomes such as the management of and training in diversity, and has recently agreed to give greater emphasis to equality and diversity in its reports. It interprets "inspection of the duty" as assessing how well the diverse needs of offenders and staff are met, but not, for example, whether the specific statutory duties regarding the ethnic monitoring of training, or the race impact assessment of proposed policies, are actually fulfilled. Where figures, for example on access to staff training by race, do not appear in an inspection report, it is impossible to know whether this is because such figures are not kept or the inspectorate did not choose to consider this in its assessment of diversity.
	The reports of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Courts Administration—HMICA—rarely refer to race equality matters other than the existence, or otherwise, of signs in minority languages and interpreting facilities. Its predecessor body, Her Majesty's Magistrates' Courts Service Inspectorate, published a helpful thematic inspection report in 2003 on how far the magistrates' courts committees had met their duty to publish compliant race equality schemes, whereas HMICA has a subject for each round of inspections, so far based on different aspects of the efficient use of resources, which seems to have marginalised race equality considerations.
	The Commission for Racial Equality has proposed that inspecting the courts service's delivery of the duty should be planned for, but is unaware of any steps so far in this direction. Perhaps the Minister will be able to advise us how far that might have gone. Her Majesty's Crown Prosecution Inspectorate—HMCPI—does not inspect the compliance of the prosecution service with its statutory general and specific duties as such, but it is currently conducting a thematic inspection on race equality, on which it consulted the commission before embarking. It appears likely that it will effectively gauge progress towards race equality in the service and so discharge the inspectorate's own duty. The CRE is concerned that the merger of the different inspectorates in one body will weaken the attention given to the race equality duty and bring it back to its most common denominator, thereby effectively diminishing its impact in making a substantial change in the criminal justice system.
	In addition, the Government's strategy to increase race equality and community cohesion, Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society, identifies public service inspectorates as having a crucial role in contributing to service improvements,
	"ensuring that promoting equality and diversity is at the heart of public services".
	The aim over the three years of the strategy is for inspectorates to continue to build on this progress, ensuring that equality and diversity are integral to their work. It goes on to outline how various inspectorates of the criminal justice system will achieve that.
	To be able to deliver the objectives of the government-wide strategy, there is a need for a clear requirement in the Bill that obliges the new inspectorate to inspect for the delivery of the statutory general and specific duties. The current anomaly of different inspectorates interpreting their duty differently should be succeeded by the adoption by the new inspectorate of current best practice, which in the CRE's view is that of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary.
	We believe that the Secretary of State should produce annual reports on the progress of inspection and regulation bodies on race equality. That would be consistent with Article 5 and Schedule 2 of the Disability Discrimination (Public Authorities) (Statutory Duties) Regulations 2005, which provide for 10 Secretaries of State and the National Assembly for Wales to submit every three years a report on the progress made on disability equality in their respective sectors.
	To briefly sum up, the various criminal justice inspectorates are currently covered by both the general statutory duty under the Race Relations Act and also by the specific requirement to ensure that those public authorities for which it has responsibility are compliant with all of their statutory duties. Can the Minister give a categorical assurance that the newly created inspectorate, Her Majesty's Chief Inspector for Justice, Community Safety and Custody, will comply with its responsibilities to inspect and report on race equality and reflect those responsibilities in respect of all other functions? I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: Perhaps I may say how much I welcome the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, because she ably and elegantly highlighted the current discrepancies between the disparate inspectorates, particularly in relation to race. Perhaps I may respectfully say that she gave an eloquent exposition as to why we need a joined-up inspectorate: we are now working with the inspectorate on the high-level business strategy for the future inspection regime and a specific strand is dedicated to race and diversity, which is being led by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies, so that the new inspectorate will use the best of existing practice.
	The noble Baroness is right: the various criminal justice inspectorates are currently covered by both the general statutory duty under the Race Relations Act and by the specific requirement to ensure that the public authorities that they have responsibility for are compliant with all of their statutory duties. This Government expect the new single inspectorate to comply with its responsibilities to inspect and report on race equality and to reflect those responsibilities in respect of all other functions.
	Schedule 11(6) adds the new chief inspector to the list of bodies which are subject to the general statutory duty under the Race Relations Act to have due regard, in carrying out their functions, to the need to eliminate race discrimination and promote race equality and race relations. The first amendment would not add meaningfully to that. Presentationally, it might afford race equality greater emphasis, but that would beg the question as to the place of equally important issues, such as gender and disability equality and human rights. I know that the noble Baroness highlighted that when she said that sometimes we forget. Well, we are not forgetting here. We consider the Race Relations Act sufficient statutory underpinning for this important element of inspectorate business.
	To give practical effect to the duty under the Race Relations Act, we have included in the programme of work and development of the business strategy for the new inspectorate a specific strand on race equality, led by specialists from the existing inspectorates. So, all the people who have that expertise will be able to help us to get the best possible quality-assured way of dealing with this issue in the new inspectorate. That will ensure that the substantial commitment to inspecting race equality outcomes, as a routine part of the inspection business that already exists in the justice sector inspectorates, is carried forward and developed in the new inspectorate. The noble Baroness will know that we have been very concerned about the present level of disparity and we need to grip that and find a more aggressive and successful way of dealing with it, so that we can assure ourselves that the system that we are creating is as fair, transparent and open as we can make it. It is a matter of great concern to us.
	This work will involve the Commission for Racial Equality and other key stakeholders. We intend that inspecting for race equality and diversity generally, so as to ensure that inspected bodies have in place effective arrangements for the discharge of their obligations, will continue as an integral part of each inspection. We want the new chief inspector to have flexibility in determining how diversity in all its manifestations is to be examined—certainly, as a routine part of assessing performance, and also, perhaps, through occasional dedicated thematic inspections. Nevertheless, if, in future, Ministers consider that this responsibility is not being given sufficient emphasis by the chief inspector, they will be able to use the power of direction contained in Clause 30(3) to direct the chief inspector to have regard to this aspect of Government policy. That is a good example of the potential use that we envisage for this power. I know that it has drawn criticism from some but it might help the noble Baroness and those who later read what I have said to better understand why these provisions may not be quite as stupid or as flawed as some may suggest.
	The second of the amendments would place on the Secretary of State a duty to report annually to Parliament on the progress of inspection and regulation bodies in respect of race equality. The Bill already contains, in Clause 32, improved and strengthened provisions for reporting by the chief inspector, through the responsible Ministers, to Parliament. We would expect the chief inspector's annual report on the discharge of his duties to include reference to the discharge of the duty placed on him or her by the Race Relations Act, and the discharge of that duty will, as I have explained, be a constant factor in inspection activity. Ministers will be required to lay the annual report before Parliament.
	I hope that I have reassured the noble Baroness that the amendment, which makes reference to other, unspecified, inspection and regulation bodies, is not necessary. We believe that the appropriate place for reporting requirements relating to other bodies is in the legislation governing those bodies. Therefore, I hope that this is one amendment that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw and that she will not need to come back to it on Report.